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INTPX2)UCTI0N
In summing up at tho oonclusion of this long and
profoundly important trials the prosecution is anxious
to observe the utmost economy of -vfords and means. The
burdens -which this trial has imposed, on the Tribunal
and on counsel for the prosecution and defense alike,
have been heavy. The record of the testimony is leng
thy, and tho documentary exhibits are voluminous j the
analysis of the entire record is a formidable under
taking, On the part of the prosecution, we intend to
embody our detailed analysis of the record, and our
summation of the evidence as it relates to each in
dividual defendant, in the briefs which we will file.
It is our plan to file briefs with respect to each de
fendant covering the charges under Counts Two and
Three of the indictment. We also plan to file an
over-all brief under Count One of the indictment,
s-nd in this brief to include a summation of the evi
dence under Count One relating to each defendant.
In this oral summation, accordir^ly, we do not
propose to deal exhaustively with each ctergo of the
indiotment nor mth each defendant. To undertake a
full and detailed exposition of this sort would, we
thirilc, prolong this statement unneoessariay and need
lessly duplicate much of what will appear in our
triefs. Today we propose only to deal, as compactly
of the more salient featurespossible, with some
Of this trial and to endeavor to achieve a synthesis
-nd emphasis which will be helpf.1 to the Tribunal
in striking a final balanoo,
Sevei^l defenses v/hich have been urged in this
case are comuon to all, or nearly all, of the trials^
whioh have been held in Hurriberg. For the most part.
* 1 ••
these defenses have been argued on numerous occasions
✓
by both prosecution and defense^ and h&ve been deter»
mined and re-determined in a succession of judgments*
Y/ith those defenses, T/a do not propose to deal at
length again on this occasion. For example, counsel
for the defendant Leeb, in his opening statement,
challenged the entire concept of the crime against
peace as invalid on the basis that it is ^ post
facto law.^ As to this argument, the prosecution
finds itself quite unable and, indeed, feels it quite-
unnecessary, to add anything to v/hat it has urged on
numerous prior occasions or to vrhat has been set forth
in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal
and the judgments of IMlitary Tribunals III and VI in
the Farben case (Case No, 6) and the Krupp case (Case
No, 10), Likewise, it has been repeatedly suggested
that the so-called defense of "superior orders" is a
complete bar to the prosecution of these defendants.
This argument, too, has been extensively briefed and
argued in all the previous Nurnberg trials, and has
been discussed and rejected in the judgments. We
will have considerable to say concerning the extent
to vfhioh this plea should be given weight by way of
mitigation, but vfe do not propose to deal virith it
again as a defense. On such matters, we will con
tent ourselves by submitting appendices to the
Cooirt containing references to or quotations from
the relevant portions of previous judgments and
arguments.
1, Opening Statement of Dr, Hans I^ternser, p, 30^
^ 2 —
CRB5ES AC5A.INST lEA-CE: COUNTS-ONE AND FOUR
We will deal first with the otoges in Counts One and Four of
the indictment relating to the crime against peace, which the Inteiv-
national I-Olitary Tribunal described as ^ "the supreme internatioml
crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains with
in itself the accumulated evil of the whole". Similarly, Presiding
2
Judge Anderson, in his concurring opinion in the Krupp case, declared
"that aggressive war is the supreme crime and no penalty is too se
vere for those vfho are responsible for it",- And Judge Wilkins,,in-
his Special Concurring opinion in the same case, stated;^
The accusation to have committed a crime against peace is
the gravest that can be raised against any individual. It
transcends any other crime, as far as regards the sinister
character of the criminal intent, the amount, magnitude and
duration of harm and evil wh'ioh it necessarily involves and
the disregard for the sufferings of persons and entire na
tions, including the wrongdoer's own fellow-citizens and
own country.
A. General Principles of Criminal Liability
The general principles to be applied in determining the guilt or
innocence of the individual defendants in this case are principles
weia^known and generally accepted in the penal law systems of civilized
nations generally. The most elementary and basic principle is that
crimir0-l guilt always requires two elements — action and state of
^ *
mind. Both are essential. The fact that a man thinks, desires, or
✓
concludes is not in itself crimiml, no matter how vicious or depraved
these thoughts, desires, or conclusions n^y be,-. Nor is an act, stand
ing alone, ordinarily to be judged criminal, regardless of the actor's
concomitant state of mind or knowledge
That this basic principle is applicable in the field of inter-
✓
national penal law, just as in domestic penal law, is abundantly ap-
; from the judgment of the International MUitary Tribunal and
1;;—Vdi,".l/ Trial of the 1-^jor War Criminals, p, 186.
2, Concurring Opinion of Judge'Anderson, in United States v,
Alfried Krupp (Case No, 10), p, 1—2,
3, Special 0oncurring Opinion of Judge V/ilkins^ in United States
V, Alfried ICrupp (Case No, 10), p, 38,
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the judgments in the Farben and Kmpp cases. Thus, with respect to
the necessary element of "action" of "participation", in the oase be-'
fore the II!T the defendant Kaltenbrunner was acquitted of the charge
of planning and preparing aggressive war because the evidence against
him was not thought to "show his direct participation in any plan to
wage such a v^ar»"^ The defendant von Sohirach was acquitted of the
same charge because "it does not appear.••-.that he participated in the
planning or preparation of any of the wars of aggression."^ And the
defendant Sols-cht was acquitted of part of the charge of conspiracy to
wage agg3:»essive v/ar because "his participation in the occupation of
Austria and the Sudetenland## ••T/as on such a limited basis that it
does not amount to participation in the comnion plan."^ Vfith respect
to the requireinent of "knowledge", or "state of mind", we find tl^t
the defendant Streicher v/as acquitted by the HJT because "there is no
evidence to prove that he liad knowledge" of Plitler^s plans The s^e
is true of the defendants Fritasche (for lade of a^y showing "that he
was informed of the decisions taken" and Bomann (for lade of a show
ing "that Bormann knew of Hitler's plans to prepare, initiate, or wag©
aggressive wars").^ And, apart from Austria and the Sudetenland, the
acquittal of Sohaoht was also expressly based on lack of knowledge:?
The case against Schacht, therefore, depends on the inference
that Schacht did in fact know of the Nazi aggressive plans.,*.
The Tribunal has....come to the conclusion that this necessary
inference lias not been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Krupp and Farben judgments follow the B-'IT decision in import
ing into international penal law, with respect to crimes against peace,
this dual requirement of participation and knoi'/lodge. Thus, in the
Farben judgment, the decision is construed as supporting a finding
of guilt "only where the evidence of both knowledge and active partici-
pation v;as conclusive".® Judge Anderson, in his concurring opinion in
1. Vol.'I, Trial of the I^jor War Criminals, p. 291.
2, Idem^ p. 318-.
3« Idem^ p. 309.
U. Idem^ p. 302.
lde:u> p. 338-.
6. idem> p. 339.
7. . Idom, p. 310. /
United States v. I^rauch (Case No. 6), p. 29.
nnr'f .. - . - —
the ICrapp judgment, expressed the principle as follows;^
The requisite knowledge, I think can "be shown either by
direct or circumstantial evidence.•••.Such Knowledge
being shov/n, it must be further established that the
aocjused participated in the plan.....
Judge UiUcins^ opinion is to the same effect
The principles of criminal liability applicable with respect
to the Crime Against Peace are the same elementary and
basic principles applicable generally with respect to
other crimes. The basic principle is that criminal guilt
requires two essential elemefits, namely action constituting
a particii)ation in the crime, and criminal intent.
The obsarvancG of those principles is particularly important in
connection with the charge of aggressive "VTar. The concept of the crime
against peace is of grave import to the world and every nation in it,
and we must insure that the dootriJie is neither extended beyond the
bounds of reason, justice, and common sense, nor contracted into a
meaningless legal stereotype. The elementaiy legal roquirement that
both participation and knov/ledge bo clearly established is the best
safeguard against killing off the concept of the crime against peace
either by dropsy or malnutrition. It will benefit no one, least of
all the prosecution, to urge a definition of the crime against peace
which v/Guld sweep v/ithin its purview thousands of more or less ordinary
men and women. The prosecution would bo the last to suggest a rule
which would incriminate the ordinary soldier v/hose participation in
these gigantic ventures was infinitesmal, or anyone who lacked the
intelligence or opportunity to realize the aggressive character of the
wars of conquest launched by the Third Reich,
By the same token, however, v/e must not adopt a standard which
v/ould exculpate those whoso participation and knowledge are clearly
established. It is both unnecessary and impossible, and indeed it
would be presumptuous, to attempt any ultiinato detailed statement of
what must be shovm by way of participation and knov/ledgo in order to
establish guilt on the charge of committing crimes a^inst peace. It
1, Concurring Opinion Of Judge Anderson, United States v AIfrled
ICrupp (case Mo, 10), p, U?.
2. Special Concurring Opinion Of Judge Wilkins, United States v#
Alfried ICmpp (Case No. 10), pp. 38-39«
is the very essence of "customary" or "common" law, such as internation~
al pen^l law is, to bring about the refinement and perfection of legal
concepts in application case by case.. As to the requirement of "pajrtici-
j
pation", vre suggest that it is necessary to establish substantial ac-
tivity in a responsible capacity, directly connected with building
up the povfer of a countiy to wag© v^ar, or with the actual v^ging of
vvar« As to "state of mind", we believe that there must be a shov/ing of
knowledge that military power would be used to carry out a policy of
✓
conquest by war or threat of war. vThen we speak of "knowledge", we
mean Icnowledge based on information of such amount and kind as must
have brought conviction to a man in the position and circumstances of
the defendant. We submit that these standards are as precise as general
standards in the law can ever be, and thaj? they are conser-vative in
their scope.
We have stressed these legal requirements because we believe
them fundamental to a wise and just application of the concept of crimes
against peace. Yfe thihli: that the evidence in this case fu3J.y meets
these requirements, and is more than adequate to establish guilt beyond
a reasomble doubt. And it will greatly aggravate the risks to which
civilization stands exposed —^ grave as they are no\T —- if this concept
is withered at the roots, by the exoneration of those who are truly
guilty of this terrible crime.
B» The Relation Between Counb One and Count Four
Count One and Count Four of the indictment in this case each env*
body a charge of the commission of crimes against peace as defined in
I^r, 1 (a) of Article H of Control Council Lav; No. 10. Count One
charges the initiation of invasions and wars of aggression in violation
of international lav/, including the planning, preparation, initiation,
or waging of v/ars of aggression or v/ars in violation of international
agreements. Count Four charges the defendants with participating in a
common plan or conspiracy for tho accomplishment of the matters charged
In Count One. Count One of tho Indictmerifc in this case corresponds, in
. general, to Count Two of the inddotmont before the International Iifilitary
Tribunal! Count Four of the indictment in this case corresponds in
- 6 -
goneral to Count One of the indictment before tho BfT. Count One of
the indictment in this case corresponds in general to Count One of the
indictments in the ICrupp and Farben cases^ and Count Four of this ii>-
dictment corresponds in general to Count Four in the Krupp case and
Count Five in tho Farben case# The relation —• involving both differ
ences and similarities betv/een the charge of planning or isaging ag-^
gressive v/ars on the one hand^ and oonspi2?acy to that end on the other
handj has been discussed or touched on in the THT, Krupp and Farben
judgments^ in numerous arguments before the Nurnberg Tribunals, and in
many speeches and articles concerning the Nurnberg trials#
The classical definition of conspiracy at English common law is
that it is a confederation to effect an unlaY/ful object, or to effect
a lawful object by unlav/ful means#^ Within the scope of this defini-
tion, conspiracy is little more than an elaboration of the law of at«-»
✓
tempts, in cases where the conspiracy was unsuccessful in attaining
its object, or of the law of principals and accessories and accomplices,
if the conspiracy succeeded in attaining an unlawful object# Within
this sphere, the law of conspiracy is, in essence, merely another mani-
festation of the problem, common to all legal systems, of how closely
or in Tfhat way an individual must be connected with a crime in order
to render him criminally responsible#
It should be noted that tho mention of "conspiracy" in Paragraph 1
(a) of Article II of Control Council Lay/ No# 10 is not the only pro
vision of Law No# 10 dealing with this questibn of the degree of con
nection Tvith crime# Paragraph 2 of Article II is solely concerned v/lth
this same question and doclares that a person is to bo deemed guilty if
he was a "principal" or an "accessory", or vfas connected with the crime
in certain other specific respects. This paragraph does not ai^ljny the
word "conspiracy", but its scope is, we suggest, at least as broad as
that of the doctrine of conspiracy#
1. Vol. 11, V/harfcon's Criminal Law, (12th Ed#), p# 18^3, and
oases there cited#
*♦. 7
•... - .r, • iiT'r'^ fr '^rr l'ii ' fl
In dGSling Td.th tho charge of conspiracy in Count Four of this
indictment^ therefore^ wo are dealing only T/ith the question of vfhat
degree of connection with the crime against peace a defendant must be
shovm to have had in order to render him criminally liable. In this
field, Anglo-HSaxon jurisprudence used the terminology of principals and
accessories, accomplices and confederates, conspiracies and attemptsr •
✓
In other judicial systems, these v/ords and other v/ords are used. There
are some differences beinveen the various judicial systems, but the
basic purpose of these concepts is common to all. systems. .
The distinctions and subtleties which have been woven around the
concepts of attempt, accessory, and conspirator in Anglo-Saxon law are
r
very refined and surely thace is much overlapping, as has been pointed
out in a leading tojcfc onAnglo»^axon criminal law.^ Judge Anderson,
in his Concurring opinion in the Krupp case, observed that:^
Conspiracies differ from attempts only in that in the fomer
it is not necessary that the act of the accused shall ap
proach as near to the consummation'of the criminal objective
as in tho latter and in conspiracy, as distinguished from
attempt, two or more persons are necessarily involved.
Where, as in this case, many more than two persons are involved and
the criminal objective was actually consummated, the distinction be-
tween criminal guilt as a conspirator, or as a principal, accessory,
or confederate, becomes wellnigh imperceptible.
^ y
Is there, then, any real distinction between the charges in
Counts One and Four of this indictment? Judge Anderson has expressed
the view that the offense of "conspiracy" is identical v;ith the offense
of "plannir^, preparation, or initiation" of aggressive war, but tl^t
"waging" is a distinct offense. As he put itj3
As already pointed cut, the seems to have regarded
the '"planning, preparation, initiation and waging" of"
aggressive wars as constituting tv/o separate offenses,
one consisting of the acts of "planning, preparation and
initiation", and tho other of "v/agmg" aggressive v/ar.
1. Vol. II, Wharton*s Criminal Law (12th Ed,), p, I86l,
2# Concurring opinion of Judga'Anderson in United States v,
Alfried KrUpp (Case No, 10), p« 36.
y
3, Idem, p, 5?^
8
To repeat^ the offense of planning,, preparation and '
initiation of aggressive 7/ars is, in practical effect,
the same as the conspiracy.
Very lilcaly Judge Anderson vra-s led to this conclusion by the cireiuar'
stance that the IMP acquitted the defendant Doenitz of conspiracy to
•wage aggressive -wars, and expressly found that he did not plan, pre«
✓ ^
pare, or initiate such -wars, but nonetheless convicted him of ivaging
aggressive wars.^ And, at first glance, one might find further sux>-
port for Judge Anderson*s conclusion in the following language from
the U® 'judgment;^
ELanning and preparation are essential to the making of war^
In the opinion of the Tribunal aggressive war is a criuo
under international law,' The Charter defines this offense
as planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of
aggression "or participation in a Common Plan or Conspira-cy
for the accomplishment,.#,,of the foregoing"... The Indictment
follows this distinction. Count One charges the Common Plan
or Conspiracy, Ccqnt Two charges the planning and i-vaging of
war. The same evidence has been introduced to support bbth
Counts, We shall therefore discuss both Countis together, as
they are in substance the'same. The defendants have been
charged under both Counts, and their guilt under each Count
must be determined,
Indedd, this language on its face seems to go even farther than the
Doenitz decision, and to remove the distinction between the charge of
conspiracy and the charge of "waging" aggressive war.
But, despite the language quoted above, when it came to determinigg
the guilt or innocence of the individual defendants, the II.IP came to
veiy different conclusions under Count One of that indictment — charging
conspiracy —^ than it did under Count Two, which charged with the plan-
✓ ✓
ning, preparation, initiation and waging of aggressive wars,. Bight de^-
fendants were convicted under Count One and fourteen were acquitted*
Twelve defendants were convicted under Count Two and only four were
acquitted^ six were not charged under Count Two, What a judgment ac
tually stands for is to be determined much more by what it finally
holds than by two or three sentences taken from an opinion I70 pages
long. And the actual holdings of the IMT judgment show that the IMP
1, Vol, I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p, 310,
2. Idem,, p, 22l|..
— p
treated the charge of conspiracy very differently from the charge of
planning and 'vjaging aggressive -war. Nor do the actual holdings con
form ai^ better to Judge Anderson's conclusion tl».t "71/aging" is to be
treated separately, but that "planning, preparing, and initiation of
- ✓
aggressive v/ars is, in practical effect, the same as the conspiracy^
This is clearly shovm by the decision with respect to the defendant
Funk, who was acquitted on the charge of conspiracy, but v/as neverthe
less convicted on the charge of planning and preparing aggressive i^r.
The judgment with respect to Funk stated thatr^
Funk..♦..took office as Hinister of Economics and as Pleni
potentiary for Tfer Economy in early 1938, and as President
of the Reichsbank in Januaiy 1939.*«...
Funk became active in the oconoraio field after the Nazi plans
to --yjage aggS»essive war had been clearly defined....,On 30 May
1939, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Economics attend
ed a meeting at which detailed plans were made for .the finan
cing of the war.
On 25 August 1939, Funk wrote a letter to Hitler expressing
his gratitude tlmt he was able to participate in su.ch v/orld
shaking events; that his plans for the "financing of the
war", for the control of v;age and price conditions and for
the strengthening of the "Reichsbank had been completed; and
that he had inconspicuously transferred into gold all for
eign' exchange resources available to Germany. On Ik October
1939, after the war had begun, he made a speech in v/hich he '
stated that the economic and financial departments of Gernsry,
"vforking under the Four Year Plan, had been engaged in the
secret economic preparation for v/ar for over a year.
Funlc participated in the economic planning v^hich preceded the
attack on the U.S.S.R. His deputy held daily conferences
with Rosenberg on the economic problems which would arise in
the occupation of Soviet territory. Funk himself participat
ed in planning for the printing of ruble notes in Germany
prior to the attack, to sei*ve as occupation currency in the
>U#S.S.R. After the attack he made a speech in vfhich he de
scribed plans he had made for the economic axploitation of
the "vast territories of the Soviet Union" which were to be
used as a source of raw material for Europe.
Funk was not one of the leading figures in originating the
H&zi plans for aggressive Trar,.»He did, however, participate
in the economic preparation for certain of the aggressive I'ra.rs,
notably those against Poland and the Soviet Union, but liis
guilt can be adequately dealt with under Count Two of the
indictment.
The Tribunal proceeded to acquit Funk of the charge of conspiracy
bodied in Count One, but convicted him under Count Two, and the
1. Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p, 301^-5,
#«• 10 — ^,5"
quotation above shows that it was for planning and preparing aggressive
wars. This, wo submit, clearly establishes that the IMT regarded the
evidence against Funlc as insufficient to convict him on the charge of
conspiracy but sufficient to convict him on the charge of planning
and preparing aggressive war, and this decision is inconsistent with
Judge Anderson^s viev/ tha.t "planning, preparation and initiation of
aggressive wars is, in practical effect, the same as the conspiracy"#
To the same effect is the DfT judgment with respect to the defendant
Frick#^
-The reason why the JM construed the concept of "conspiracy" more
narrowly than the concept of "planning, preparing, initiating and waging"
is clear, I thinlc, if we keep in mind that in these proceedings we are
applying international penal law, and that we must not approach these
problems solely from the standpoint of ar^ single judicial system# During
the last century, continental jurists have regarded the concept of
conspiracy as somev/hat dangerous and, on the whole, lonnecessary in view
of the broadening of the concept of attempts# Thus, "conspiracy (Komplott),
as a distinct offense, was stricken from the revised codes of many of the
• 2
German states during the 19th century"# Many French jurists also look
upon the doctrine of conspiracy with disfavor. The French member of the
^ 3
IJfC, Professor Donnedieu de Vabres, has statedj
The general notion of conspiracy is peculiar to British law.
The indictment includes in this term the entire Hitlerian^
enterprise leading to tha seizure of power and to aggressive
war..#.#
The danger of such incriminations is to open the ^or to
despotism. The charge of conspiracy is the favorite weapon
of tyranny
1# Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p# 299-300.
2. Vol. IT, T'Jharton's Criminal Law (12th Ed.), p# 1861.-
3. Donnedieu de Vabres, Le Process de Nuremberg, unpublished
lecture, spring of 19h5s to the Associations des Etudes
Internationales et Criminologiques. .
-11^
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mi- 1 .j vj-P suFf'estj fully explain why theThe above consideraTiionsj we 9
applied the concept of "conspiracy" to international penal law moh
more mrrowly than the concept of "planning^ preparing, initiating and
™agtog"» under the DfT holdings, it appears that, in order to he
of conspiracy, the defendant must have occupied a more prominent role, •
or have been in closer contact with the Chief of State, than is necessary
to the case of "planning, preparing, initiating and waging". Thus, to
the case of the defendant Funk, the DH found that he was "not one of
the leading figures to originating the Nazi plans for aggressive vjar."^
And with respect to the defendant Friok, who was also acquitted of con
spiracy but convicted of "planning, preparing, initiating, and wagtogS
the IMI' stateds^
The evidence does not show that he participated to
conferences at which Hitler outlined his aggressive intentiow.
Consequently the Tribunal takes the view that Frick was not a
member of the common plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive
war as defined in "^his judgment.
It is too soon to tell what place the doctrine of conspiracy will
eventually occupy in international pei^l jurisprudence# In the
judgmantj the views of the continental jurists prevailed. }ltr» Henry L.
StiiTison criticized the BCT judgment on -precisely this ground:^
If there is a weakness in the Trlbunalfs findings, I believe
it lies in its very IBnited construction of the legal concept
of conspiracy. That only eight of the 22 defendants should
have been found guilty on the count of conspiracy to conuBxt
the various crimes involved in the indictment seems to me
surprising^ I believe that the Tribunal would have been
justified in a broader construction of the law of conspiracy.**
In his opinion in the Krupp case. Judge Anderson came to a contrary
conclusiontU
No less authority than 15r, Henry L. Stimson, one of the
greatest American statesmen and lawyers, has regretted
that the IMT gave a restricted construction to the pro
visions of'the London Charter relating to the crime'of
conspiracy, but with due deference to all concerned, I
have felt bound to disagree.
1. Voli I, Trial of the Tfejor ¥far Criminals, p-. 30^.
2. Idem., p» 299
3* Benry Li Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trials Landmark in Law,
Vol 2^ "foreign Affairs" No, 2 (January 19U7), p. IQTT"
I4. Concurring Opinion of Judge'Anderson in United States v.
Alfried Krupp (Case Noi 10), p. 72.
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In the present case, at least as to most of the defendants, the
distinction drawn by the between "conspiracy" and "planning, pre^
paring, initiating, and waging" is, vfe believe, academic, for most of
the defendants attended cne or more of the Hitler conferences which
Funk and Frick did not attend* As is apparent from the JMS judgnient,
attendance at these conferences, or other opportunity to learn at first
hand of Hitler's intentions, vjas the test generally utilized by the
IMT to determine whether an individual defendant was guilty of con-
spirac3% Consequently, most of these defendants woiad fall within the
more limited concept of conspiracy adopted by the BfT and Judge Ander
son*
Before leaving the subject of conspiracy, a special v;ord should
be added with respect to the invasions of Austria and Czechoslovakia.
In the indictment before the W, these invasions were charged as
criminal aggressive acts committed in the course of the conspiracy de«
nounced in Count One, but were not charged as elements of "planning,
f ' ' ' '
preparing, initiating, and waging" in Count Two. Consequently, although
seven of the eight defendants^ convicted of conspiracy wore convicted
in part on the basis of the invasions of Austria and CzechoslovaidLa,
none of the convictions under Count Two YJ-ere or could have been based
on the Austrian and Czeohoslovakian invasions. Thus, although the de-
fendarrfc Kaltenbrunnor was found to have been connaoted with the invasion
of Austria, the IMT pointed out that "the Anschluss, although it was an
aggressive act, is not charged as an aggressive war",2 and the same ob
servation was made in the case of Schacht*^
In the present case, however, the invasions of Austria and Gzecho-
slo"vakia are not only charged as components of the conspiracy under
Count Four of this indictment, but also as invasions and aggressive
acts under Count One. And the B!T found tt^t the seizures of Austria
and Czechoslovakia were "invasions" and "acts of aggression"^ and ex
pressly held that the occupation of Austria was a "crime within the
1. All but Rosenberg.
2. Vol» I, Trial of the li&jor War Criminals, p, 291*
3» Idem#, p, 309*
i+. Idenu, pp, 192, 19lt>^nd 198*
*-13 -
jurisdiotion of the Tribunal" Consonuently^ whereas the BIT I'vas o-
bliged under the indictment before it to treat the invasions of Austria
and Czechoslovakia only under the charge of "conspiracy"^ no such ne-*
cessity exists under the indictment in this case#
C« The Responsibility of I!ilitary Leaders for
Grimes Against Peaoe
Throughout the proceedings before this Tribunal and before the
BIT, the defense has contended that the military leaders, by virtue of
the veiy nature of their profession, are not susceptible to prosecution
for crimes against peace and "ivar crimes* The reasoning in support of
this position has been stated in various ways* Sometimes it takes the
form of the argument that the doctrine of superior orders is a complete
defense to the prosecution of a military leader* Before the BvIT, Dr,
Laternser declared that the Gem&n military leaders were being prose-,
cuted because they served their country as soldiers, and argued that
a military man "is not allowed to decide for himself whether the cause
for which he fights is good or bad", and that it is "his duty to obey
s-nd to ask no questions"Counsel for L.eeb took the same position be
fore this Tribunal*3 in this respect, counsel went farther tt&n the
defendant Leeb himse3f, who agreed that the acts of a soldier, as of
Anyone else, imist be limited by his own "hm&n conscience", and that a
soldier is under no duty to commit crime,^
This argument of military immunity, which would reduce military
men to a sort of sub-human status as mon incapable of exercising moral
judgment on their own behalf — no more answerable to the lavrs of God
s.nd man than animals and sii^ll children has, fortunately, found no
a-Qceptanoo in international pen&l law. The same arguments were made
y y ^
on behalf of the defendants Koitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raeder before
1« Vol. I, Trial of the I4ajor War Criminals, p, 318,
2, KLea before the IMT by Dr, Kans Laternser, p,
3* Opening Statement of Dr, Laternser, p, iB,
it. Testimony of Fieldmarshal Leeb before the Commission of the
BIT, pp, 1615-16,
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the BIT and-ware unqualifiedly rojeoted# KeitaL, Jodlj Doerdtz^ and
Raeder were all found guilty of ca^imes against peace, in addition to
•war ordjnes and crimes against humanity^ Before the Numberg Llilitary
Tribunals established Under Control Council Lav; No» 10, military leaders
were held ansv/erable under the laws of v^ar and con"7icted of v^ar crimes
by Tribunal v in the so-called "hostage" case (United States v. List,
✓ ^
et al,, (Case No; 7), as v;ell as in the Medical case and the lulch
case.^ The responsibility of military loaders for crimes against peace
has not been involved in any of the pro-vious trials under Law No, 10,
but both the garben and Krupp oudgments indicate quite clearly tiiat the
mili-tary leaders are answerable, just as is ar:yono else, if their
guilt is established by the e-vidence* Thus, in the judgment of Tribun
al VI acquitting the Farben defendants on the charge of crimes against
peace, the Tribunal statodj2
The defendants now before us were neither high public offi
cials in the civil governtnent nor high military officers.
Their participation v^as that of followers and not leaders.
A.nd Judge Anderson, in his concurring opinion dismissing the charges of
aggressive warfare against the IhTupp defendants, stressed that the de-
✓fends.nts in that case "were priTOte citizens and nonoombatants", and
that none of them ted any "control over the conduct of the viar or over
any of tho armed forces; nor wero any of them parties to the plans
pursuant to v;hich the wars were •V7aged"»3
If those remarks are diota, the judgmont of the njC is not. The
decisions as to Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz and Raeder categorically and un
equivocally establish that military leaders, just as other men, are
bound: by f;Ke oUlgatidM or ffl-fernational law and can be proseaSted"""
for Violations thereof, whether the charge be the commission of crimes
against peace or of crimes against tho laws and cfustoms of Il>«
deed, the BU* went much farther, and squarely expressed the view that
1, United States v, Karl Brandt, et al*, (Case No, l)j United
States V, Erhardt Milch (Case No, 2);
United States v, Carl Krauch, et al,, (Case No, 6), p, 63,
3, Concurring opinion 6f Judge Anderson in United States v, Al-
fried Krupp, et al,, (case No, 10), p, 65,
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.Vi,i i%i «Vi i •
many military leaders, other than the four ivhom It convicted as indi-
✓
viduals, must also have been guilty of crimes against peace and "war
crimes. The IMT declined to render a. declaration of criminality against
the General Staff and High Command on the ground that it was not an
"organizatioh" or "grcfup" within the meaning of that word as used in
the London Charter, but in so doing the declaredjl
Although the Tribunal is of the opinion that the term «^oup"
in Article 9 must'mean something more than this collection of
militaiy officers, it has heard much evidence as to the par
ticipation of the officers in planning and waging aggressive
war, and in committing War Grimes and Crimes against Humanity,
This evidence is, as to many of them, clear and convincing.
Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to
trial so that those among them who are guilty of these
crimes should not escape punishment.
We may tafce it as established, then, that the guilt or innocence
of these defendants under Counts One and Four of the indictment is to be
determined on the basis of the same principles as are applicable in the
I
case of other defendants charged T/ith the planning and waging of aggress
ive war. We come back once again to the two necessary elements of act
and state of mind. In order to establish their guHt, it must be
shown that they carried on. substantial activity in a responsible ca
pacity in connection with the planning or waging of war. It must be
shown that they carried on suoh activity with the knowledge that the
military power would be used, or was being used, to carrj'- out a pclicj'
of conquest by means of aggressiYe wars or the threat of aggressive
wars.
In order to determine whether the element of "participation" has
been sufficiently established against any given defendant, it is necessary
to establish the position or positions which he occupied at the time the
✓
aggressive wars were being planned and vra-ged, and the nature and scope
of the authority, responsibility, and duty which attached to his posi
tion or positions. In this connection, v/e suggest, the defendant >s
rank is but one factor to be considered among numerous others. To be
1, Vol, I, Trial of the ifejor War Criminals, pp, 278-79,
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sure, it is ordinarily tiue that a General discharges more important
and responsible functions than a Major, that he is in a better position
to influence the course of events, and that he is likely to have bettea>
access to information. But this is by no means universally truei A.
young staff officer of relatively junior rank at OM or OKH, for instance,
might well have much better informa-tion and far more actual influence
in planning operations that a very much more senior officer in a rou
tine training or administrative position. In the field, the Chief of
Staff of an Am^r or Am^ Grcfup would ordinarily have responsibilities
and information of far broader scope tls-n the comniander of s division, ^
though the latter might well be of senior rank, Ih short, the matter
of rank should not be altogether overlooked, but it should not be given
more Y/eight than the circumstances in any given case warrant.
Similarly, as a general and abstx^tct proposition of internatioi^l
penal law, vre can not gauge the question of participation solely by the
size of tte fomation "which an officer commands. In wars betvfeen the
ne.jor militaiy powers the connnandor of a battalion, regiment, bri^de
or even division may not loom veiy large. But in Yjars between the
small countries, a battalion or even a compai^ may be the strategic
equivalent of a division, Analagously, the role of the German mili
tary leaders in the conquest of Denmark is not to be lightly pushed
aside merely because the Danish airoy Yvas small and therefore very ^evsr
Geme-n troops to be employed to effect the conquest of Denmark,
In short, in determining such questions as the degree of "parti—
oipation", or whether the information available to a man must have
been stifficient to bring conviction to his mind, wo must apply the
standards of raaaorKLble men to the circumstances in each case as they
appear from the evidence,
D, The E'Vidanco'Relied Upon by the BffTt ICeitel,
Jodl, Raeder and Doonita
Bofore turning to tho o'viddnco with respect to the defendants in
this case, it will be profitable to look once more at the opinion of
the BET, By e^oamining the judgnusnts of tho BIT against tho militaiy
17 ^
defendants in that case Keitel^ JodL, Raoder and Doenita ive may
ascertain what facts and circumstances were held to constitute the
necessary evidence v/ith respect to participation and knowledge in order
to support the verdict of guilty v;hioh was rendered as to all four of
those defendants*
«> ^
There was,, of course, a fifth military defendant tried by the
Its? ^ Hermann Goering, who v/as the Coniniander^ii>-«Chief of the Luftv/affe*
Goering, however, was not a career soldier, and his offices and re
sponsibilities under the Third Reich v/-ere of so varied a nature that
✓ •
his inclusion with Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, and Doenitz vrould not be il-
✓ - -
luminating. We may note, however, that the Bffi, in finding liim guilty
of crimes against peace, stressed the role which the Luftivaffo played
in the subjugation of Czechoslovakia, Goering's meetings with Hitler
and the other military leaders on 23 I'^y 1939 and 22 August 1939 "vhich
preceded the attack on Poland, his participation in planning the inva«
i
sion of Norway, and his status as Gommander-in-Chiof of the Lufty/affe
in all of the aggressive wars,
✓ •
Keitel, as Chief of the OKW, had no command authority over the
three branches of the Wehrmaoht, but w^ in effect the Chief of Hitler^s
own military staff, which assisted and advised the Puohror in the prepa-
ration of his directives and coordinated the operations of the Army,
Navy, and Air Foroe,^ Keitel was hold to have been connected vfith all
the invasions and aggressive wars involved in the IMT case* With re—•
speot to Austria, Keitel — together y/ith Reichenau and the defendant
Sperrle • attended the conforenoe with Schusclinigg in February 1938,
in order to make a "militaiy demonstration"# When Sohuschnigg called
for a plebiscite on the question of Austrian independence, Keitel par
ticipated in the improvised military arrangements for the march into
Austria, During the ensuing months, Keitel signed or initialled many
✓
of the OKW directives and memoranda in the so-called "Fall Gmien", the
plan for the militaiy destiniction of Czechoslovakia, After toiich, he
\,
initialled other directives for the conquest of the remainder of V; .•..)•
1# Vol# I, Trial of the Ifejor War Criminals, p, 288*-289,
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Czechoslovakia,,. Keitel ivas present at the conference with hitler on
23 l^y 1939, when the Fuehrer announced his intention "of attacking Po-
y
land at the first suitable opportunity'*^ and signed or initialled vari--
ous of the directives in connection with "Fall Weiss"^. the plan for the
military destruction of Poland.- The plans for the invasion of Norway
and Denmark wore originated by the Gerir&n Navy, and were finally com-»
pleted by a special inter-service staff under Keitel's supervision.
y
Keitel signed various directives for the attack in the "West, in viola-
y y
tion of the neutrality of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. He ini
tialled numerous diroctivos for the wars against Groeoo and Tugoslavia^
Ho initialled many directives in "Fall Barbarossa", the plan-for the
✓
military destruction of the U.S.S.R., and attended Hitler's conference
with the military leaders on lU «}ane 19^-il, just before the attack. •
Jodl was a Section Chief in the in charge of operational
planning.^ The evidonoe relied upon by the UC to support his con
viction in general parallels the evidence against Keitel. Jodl, how
ever, was assigned to a minor troop command from September 1938 to
September 1939, and accordingly "ivas not found to have been involved in
the occupation of Bohemia and Horavia or the attack against Poland. He
y
participated in improvising the plans for tho invasion of Austria, and
initialled many of the directives and memoranda in "Fall Gruen", He
played a part in planning the invasion of Norway and Denmark and the
y
attack in the West, and continued his planning activities in connection
with the invasions of Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, Ho was
present at the conference between Hitler and the military loaders on
lii Juno I9l-!l, just before the Russian campaign,
Raeder was tho Goramander-ln-Chief of the Gorman Navy from 1928 to
19U3»^ In support of his conviction on the charge of crimes against
peace, the B'TT found him responsible for re-armament of the German
Navy in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, He was present, along
^ y
with Goering, von Frltsch, and others, at the conference in November
1, Vol.. I, Tr3al of the Major War Criminals, pp. 322-32li.
2, Voly.-!, Trial of the l^jor War Criminals, pp, 31$-3l6,
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1937 which Hitler outlined his plans for the eventual occupation of
Austria and Czechoslovakia^ and received various of the directives in
connection with "Pall Gruen". He likewise received directives in conr-
nection with the attack against Poland^ and directed the supporting
activities of the Na-yy in connection therev/ithi he was present at the
meetings with Hitler in and August 1939 at vhich Hitler announced
his intentions* On the suggestion of a subordinate, Raeder initiated
the idea of invading Norway, and his staff participated through the OKST
in developing the plans for the attack on Denmark and Norway, He re
ceived many directives in connection with the v/ars against Greece, "Tugo-
slavia, and the Soviet Union, and the German Na-yy lent minor support to
these operations.
Doenitz "VTas acquitted on the charge of conspiracy, ,and his con
viction under Count Two of the indictment before the BIT was based on
much narrower grounds than in the case of the other three military de
fendants.^ He v;as a Rear Admiral in cominand of the submarine arm of
the German Navy when war broke out, but rose rapidly and suocoedGd
Raeder as Commander-in-chief of the Navy in 19U3« He was not present
at any of the important conferencos where Hitler*s decisions were an
nounced. He was convicted of waging aggressive war apparently upon the
basis that the U-boat arm v/as the most important part of the German
fleet, and that he received sufficient advance information in order to
coordinate subm^ine operations with the other activities of the Wohr-
macht. V/ith respect to the invasion of Norway and Denmark, the BtT
emphasized that Doenitz made out the operational orders for the sup
porting U-boats in March 19^0, five weeks in advanco of the actual
attack.
E. The General Scope of the TSvidencd Against the Defendants
in the Present Case.
If we apply the principles which have been set forth above to the
present case, it will appear that the evidence is abundant and more than
1.. Vol.. I, Trial of the l^jor War Criminals, pp, 206, and 310-311,
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sufficiGnt to estabXish the requisite degree of participation and
knowledge on the part of the^e defendants. Furthermore, in the case
of most of the defendants^ the evidence is very parallel to and quite
as strong as the evidence relied upon by the 315T in convicting ICeitel,
Jodl, and Raeder, As to one or two of the defendants — such as the
defendant von Roques where the ovidence under Counts One and Four
fall short of this standard, tho proof is nonetheless as strong as or
stronger than the proof on the basis of which Doenitz was convicted by
the B5T of v/aging aggressive "v/ar.
In terms of the nature of "participation" it will be observed
that the thirteen defendants should be divided into two more or less
distinct groups. Four of the defendants — Schniewind, Reinecko, T^ar-
limont and Lehmann — wore leading staff officers vfhose activities were
carried on at the very highest levels, the OKET and the OKM. To borrow
a phrase from American military vocabulary, we would say that these
four defendants functioned "at Yfar Department level". The importance
of Schniewindis position as chief of the Iteinelcommandoamt and Chief of
Staff of the SKL, where he was in charge of all matters pertaining to
✓
operations ani intelligence, needs no emphasis. During the years from
1938 to I9I1I, when the invasions and aggressive "wars were planned and
launched, Schniewind's role in planning and guiding the operations of
tho Geimian Ravy as a whole was second only to that of Raeder himself.
✓
With Raader, he attended three of the four conferences stressed by the
IMT at which Hitler outlined his plans, so heavily relied upon by the
HIT in finding Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder guilty of conspiracy to v<ago^
aggressive war. He was active in the invasion of Norway and Denmark,
in which the Navy played a major rolo. Ha received tho same directives
which Raeder received in oonnootion with tho wars in which tho Goiraan
Navy played a smallor part.
During the same period, Reineoke and Lehmann wore tho chiefs of
important departments of tho OKW. Thdy wero not directly concerned
with operations, and did not attend the major meetings which Hitler
held with the military leaders, but each within his own sphora — law,
prisoners of war affairs, and othor Important fields —was called upon
r* 21 •-»
to plan for coming oporationsj and to issue appropriate directives
during the course of the •wars and for the occupation of eneny terri-
tory» Thus,, in ad"vanoe of the Russian csampaign, Lehmann participated
.1]Tim I I *"" "
in preparing and distributing the "Commissar Order", and Reinocke made
plans for the screening and handling of Russian prisoners of "wari
The defendant Yferliinont v/as not directly responsible to Kcitol,
and -was junior in rank to Reineclce, but as chief of the most iinportant
section in Jodl*s dGpartnoent, YiTarlimont's role in planning and T/aging
of aggressive ivar -was much more iinportant than that of Reineoke. As
Chief of the Planning Section of Jodl's department, Warlimont was fully
informed of all operational intentions, and participated actively in
the preparation of operational plans, but his activities transcended
purely operational matters, and it is safe to say tt^t no defendant in
the dock was connected in such a multiplicity of ways virith the planning
and waging of aggressive "war as was Warlimont. He is a prii^e example
of the fact that the in^iortance of a inilitaiy leader's aoti'vities and
the information at his disposal can not be determinQd merely by his
rank.
The other nine defendants vfere all top level field commandGrs.
The defendant iSfltaaflift,. from the outbreak of the war to August 19i|i;,
commanded an Air Fleet (luftflotto), the Air Force equivalent of an
Army Group. He transferred to the Luftwaffe at about the time of the
denunciation of the arms limitation of the Treaty of Versailles in
1935, and, as Corwoander of the Condor Legion in SBaln^.. gcmandod the
revived air ana of the Wehnraoht in its first combat tost. Sporrlo^
together with Keitol and Reichenau, partioipatod in the "military dor.h'
onstration" at the Schuschnigg conforencQ, and Sperrle coinmandGd the
Air Force whioh would have been used for the conquest of Czechoslovakia
%
pursuant to "Fall Gruen". As Commander of the Gorman Air Forces in the
West, Sperrle participated in numorous highr^evel planning^, conferences
Snd in the prcps-rstion and GOcecution of the invasion of the Low Countries
and France#
Of the other eight defendants, all except Roques were top flight
^ 22 **
Arn^ fiold coinmndGrs who, daring the course of tho war, coimaanded
Arro^ Groups or Armies* The overall plans of campaign for Germany! s
✓
aggressive wars were laid dovm in diroctivos from OM and OKH, and their
practical application in tho field was developed by the Army Group and
Army corimanders pursuant to these directives, and in consultation with
the Commandor^in-Chief of the Am^ and his Chief of Staff, As is
clearly shown by the Haider Diary and a mass of other evidence, the
leading figures in the final development of these plans were the Com-
manders-in-Chiof of the Arr;^ Groups and Amies and their Chiefs of
✓
Staff, and the Commander-^in-ChiaX of tho Army, von Brauchitsch, and
his Chief of Staff, Haider* During the period from 1938 to June 19lil,
when tho Invasions and aggressive wars were being planned and launched,
all of these defendants except Reinliardt and Roques wore, at one time
✓
or another, Commanders-irHJliiof or Cliiefs of Staff of Armies or Arn^
Groups* Until the end of 19iA, the defendant Leeb, von Rundstedt, and
von Bock were the only three Army Group commanders.. The defendant
Kaeohlor, from the very beginning, was the Commandor-in-ChiGf of an
Army, and he succeeded Leeb, upon the lattor's retirement, as the
CoiTiriiander-in-Chief of an Army Group. The defendant Hoth was a Corps
Commander during the Polish and Western campaigns, but commanded a
Fanaer Group, the tactical equivalent of an Aimiy, when the Russian ii>.
vasion was launched* The defendant Salmuth was the Chief of Staff of
✓
an Amy Group until I9I4I, when he became a Corps Commander* The
defendant Hollidt v;as the Chief of Staff of an Arny until the con
clusion of the Polish campaign, at T/hich time he bocame a Divisional
CoMTiander. The defendant Roinhardt was first a Divisional and then a
Corps Covoiiiandar, and succeeded Hoth as tho oomander of a Panaar Group
a few raontl:^ after the launching of tho Russian invasion* The de-
f endanbs Roques and Woelilor are charged under Count One only vd.th ro^
speot to the aggressive war against the Soviet Unionj Woehler was at
✓
that time the Chief of Staff of an Amy, and Roques was the Commander
of an Ariiy Group Rear Area, with the status of a Corps Commander* Of
those defendants, Leeb, ICuoohler, Ifcth, and Salmuth attended several of
the meetings at "v^ich Hitler declared his intentions, Woohlor^ as
Clii^ of Staff•of the "Eleventh Army, participated extensively in planr^
' ✓
ning the campaign against the Soviet Union, and Reinhardt and Roques
developed tactical plans at corps level,
F, The Contentions of the Defense, Analyzed
by Way of Illustration
The foregoing is but the barest skeleton outline of the evidence
against the defendants under Counts One and Four of the indictment. In
j
our brief covering Counts One and Four, we are including a detailed
suimnation of the evidence with respecrt to dach defendant, and it would
serve no useful purpose to duplicate here v/hat we are setting forth in
the brief.
Before concluding our statement under Counts One and Four, hovfever,
we will devote sorae attention to the contentions which have been put
forth on the part of the defense to meet the prosecution^a evidence.
Most of these defenses and explanations are common to all or most of
the defendants, and it would be possible to discuss these defenses in
general terms. We think, however, that it will be more helpful to the
Tribunal if we analyse these defenses in the specific form in which
they haVe been put forth by several of the individual defendants, for
in this manner the factual and legal issues will be more closely joined.
We will discuss these defenses, therefore, by examining the evidence
which has been adduced and the arguinonts which have been advanced on
behalf of the defendants Leeb, Schniewind, and Lehmann,
1, Von Leob
The defendant von Leob was in retiroinont from February until JUly
of 1938, and accordingly playgd no part in the invasion of Austria, He
was not involved in the invasion and occupation of Denmark and Norway,
nor of Greece and Yugoslavia, and is not oliargod under the paragraphs
dealing with the aggressive wars against those four countries, Leob and
Rundstedt, as the two most senior German generals^ played a loading part
in the expansion of the German army between 19S3 and 1938, and Leeb is
^ 2i|. «
specifioally charged in connection vrith the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
and the aggressive "wars launched in three major campaigns i against Po-
land, France and the United Kingdom in 1939, against Belgium, Holland,
and Luxembourg in 19iiO, ^nd against the Soviet Union in 19i4l»
Before dealing with Leeb's role in these aggressive wars, we
v/ould like first to dispose of certain arguments put forth in his be—
y
half vrliioh seen to us patently "vride of the nark. For example, Leeb
testified that he wrote a book on defensive warfare,.?- and his coonseHs
opening statement laid great stress on the supposed contrast betwe<^
the fact that Leeb is charged here vri.th v/aging aggressive war and the
fact that he is a specialist in defensive warfare#^ The prosecution is
quite unable to perceive the relevance of this evidence. It is quite
apparent that a nation "wfliiGh is defending itse3-f against an aggressive
attack may wall., if it is able, adopt offensive strategy and tactics in
self defense; it is equally apparent that an aggressor nation my find
it necessary at times to resort to defensive strategy and tactics. The
defendant Scliniewind during the course of his testimony pointed out
very clearly the "distinction tietv/een military offensive measures and
measures pertaining to aggressive ivar".-^ The armour plating on a bat-
y
tloship is defensive annament, and soldiers we»r helmets to protect
y
their heads from injuiy, but if the battleship attacks the naval forces
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of a peaceful and friendly nation, or if the soldier engages in an
armed onslaught against a peaceful neighboring countiy, the armour
plating and the helmet are surely being used for aggressive purposes.
This argument is, to put it bluntly, siiuply childish, And in ary event,
when Leeb^s forces broke tlircugh the Maginot Line,., and whan, tiaey. marched
from East Prussia to the gates of Leningrad, Leeb was not conducting de
fensive YTarfare*
Certain other contentions are qqually superficial. Thus Leeb
stressed his opposition to National Socialism because of its "vocifoi*eus
1, Tr. 2280, '
2, Opening statement by Dr, Laternser, pp» 1, o,
3 m Tr, p. USiil,
fe-
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clUyaor" and its ant1—religious aspeots;^ he repeatedly emphasized that
he is devoutly religious,2 ^nd that he protested Hinrnler^s decree en
couraging mothers to bear children out of Y/edlock53 his counsel in so
many yrords accused the prosecution of being "prejudiced" and "not solely
guided by principles of justice" because v/e have accused Leeb and othei'
"decent people of the best families";^ v/itnesses on behalf of Leehv snoh
y '
as General Hfilders-also testified that he v/as devout, and that ho suf
fered certain minor annoyances from the Nazis because of anti^^azi ut
terances by his Tfife,^ Similar evidence has been given on behalf of
other defendants. These contentions do not touch the prosecution^s
case, and accomplish only the destruction of straw men, Yfe emphasized
again and again in our opening statement that the defendants are not
charged with being J^zis, and we described in detail the numerous points
of friction between Hitler and his party cohorts on the one,hand, and
the Wehrmacht on the other. None of tho defendants is charged Yfith
being anti-religious, and no attempt l^s bean made to disparage tho
family background of any of them. These raatters are, to be sure, of
importance in evaluating an individualis entire character, but they do
not seem to us of much significance in ascertaining the defendant Loeb's
share in preparing and waging aggressive war in tho light of the mass of
direct evidence in the record.
Accordingly, let us look at the evidence with respect to Leeb's
role in the occupation of the Sudetenland, The OHHf directive for mili
tary action against Czechoslovakia was issued in May 1938, when Leeb
y
was in temporary retirement^ on the witness stand, Le6b could not re
call when he first gained knowledge of "Fall Gruen",^ According to
Leeb, he learned at some unspecified date that ho was to coiMand an
A.nry — the Twelfth Amy — for the proposed operation against
1, Tr,. p. 2281-82,.
2, Tr, p,. 2287,.
3, (Dp. p. 2283-811.,
• y
U#. opening Stat eraent of Dr. laterr^ar, p, 21,
5, Tr, p, 1926-27,
6. Tr,. p» 2300.,
Czechoslovakia, He had been on vacation in the nountains,. and sone-
tdme in August he caano to Hunioh to discuss the plan* Thorearter^
"during the nonth of August and September'* he "continued to parti
cipate in the vrorking out of the preparation of the TwelXth Arn^".l
Leeh did not "expect the possibility of an armed conflict", because,
according to hin, Germany proposed only to occupy "a border area",
"20 to 30 kilometers deep". In this area there were "either no
, ✓
Czech troops at all", or "if they were stationed there at all,
would probably withdravf to the rear areas, in case of our ad
vance"* At the end of September "the tvro interested western powers
gave their aggreement and consent", and "this invasion was carried
Out in a peaceful manner". He expressed the astonishing opinion
that "probably no shot would have been fired even if this agreement
(the itoich Agreement) had not been reached prior to the invasion",^
The actual facts, clearly established by the documents in the
record and the testimony of the defense witness HHalder, tell a
totally different story, Leeb^s service record shows that, although
he Y/as in retirement^ he was made available for service with the
Genran Army Headquarters at 1.5unich on 1 July 1938,^ Leeb wag a lo
gical choice to lead an Ari:]y into Czechoslovakia; from 1930 to 193^
he had commanded the JOlitary District at Itmich, and he was an
inhabitant of Bavaria and "knevT all about the Bavarian forest area",U
"Fall Gruen" was not a plan for the occupation of a border area twenty
to thirty kilometers deep; as the documents clearly show, it was a
plan to "sne-sh Czechoslovakia by military action", to prevent the
Czech arny from escaping into Slovakia by forcing it into battle,
and to occupy Bohemia and Moravia as speedily as possible, Leeb's
Twelfth Army and Rundstedt's Second Army were the two largest armies
to be employed in the operation^ and Leeb^s army was to piay a vital
1, Tr, pp. 2299-2301,
2, Tr, p, 2301,
B. Tr, pp; 2080-81.
U. Haider, Tr, p. 2080,
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role in smashing Czech resistance. Its mission is described in a memo-
random of a oonference taken from the "Fall Gruen" documents
Tw^th and Fourteenth Armies will work together. Their
columns must necessarily support one another during the
thrust and cause the front to collapse. Bohemia only
weakly occupied at frontier: 1 Division to 120 kilometers.
Operation therefore'promising. After the thrust in a
northerly direction^ Tvfelfth Army forces east and "races"
for Brunn, The enemy will not be able to employ reserves
according to plan.
In short, "Fall Gruen" v/as a highly aggressive plan and T;as
expressly so described by Haider,2 it was in fact so aggressive,
and so likely to involve Germaiy in conflict "with the western
powers, that most of the leading German generals were violently
opposed to it and, according to Haider, even a military revolU
against Hitler was planned. The Chief of the German General Staff,
✓
Beck, submitted a memo warning that the execution of "Fall Gruen"
wcruld precipitate a v;orld war. The German generals did not think
that Germany was prepared for such a v;ar, and Haider testified that
they went to dangerous extremes to forestall such a development,3
Indeed, this very episode is one of the matters chiefly relied upon
by the defense in order to show that the German generals did not
have an aggressive mentality and were opposed to Hitler, In the
face of this overv/helming evidence, Leebts testimony that "Fall
Gruen" was a mere border operation is an unmitigated misrepresen-
✓
tation, and his suggestion that there would have been no fighting
even if the Munich agreement had not bean reached is utterly far>-
tastio.
Leeb also minimized his ovm activities in connection vd-th
"Fall Gruen" in a manner which finds no support in the record. The
picture he paints of himself at this time as a retired officer, with
1, 388-15, Fcos, Exh, lOiiS, Bk XII, p, 59.
2, Tr, p, 1868,
3, I-^ilder, Tr, p, iSijl-liit,
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his mind concentrated on research into family archives and vacations
in the moimtains, who merely "took an interest in these preparations",
v/ill not withstand a moment reflection in the light of the record*^
Leeb and Haider both testified that Leeb took no part in the mili-
taiy planning of the projected attack,^ but the documents in "Fall
Gruen" and the testimony of Leeb and Haider on cross-examination show
that a special staff viias formed in the summer of 1938 to work out the
plan of operations for the Czech attack in the sector of the Tw^-fth
^ -•
Leeb was, according to his service record, available for ser-
✓
vice in that very area at tl-at very time, and the special staff v/as
called '^/forking Staff Leeb", Haider testified that 'n/iforking Staff
Leeb" was similar to "Working Staff Rundstedt" which was formed the
follo7/ing year to plan the attack on Poland,2 A memorandum of 23
May 1939 concerning the formation of 'forking Staff Rundstedt" states :3
•liThe forking Staff Rundstedt* consists for the beginning — similar
to the 'Working Staff Leeb* in Ifunich in 1938 — only of three per-
sons," In 1939 the three persons wore Rundstedt, Manstein, and
Blumentritt* Working Staff Leeb vjas composed of Leeb, ii&nstein,
and Blumentritt^ Manstein was Leeb*s Chief of Staff in the Twelfth
Arn^y, and Blumentrltt was the operations officer, Itestein, as
LeebIs Chief of Staff, attended a meeting of all the Chiefs of Staff
with Hitler at the Obersalzberg on 10 August 1939 at which the di
vergences of viows between Hitler and the generals concerning the
likelihood of intervention by the western powers, and the weaknesses
of the so-called "West Wall", flared up sensationally,^ Leeb himr.
y "
self testified that, during August and September, he "continued to
participate in the working out of the preparations of the Twelfth
Array",5
1, Tr, pp, 2077 and 2li36,
2, Haider, Tr, p, 2082-83.,
3, 368—PS,^ Pros, Exh, 10U8,^Ek XII, P» ^9*
U. 1780-PS, Pros. Exh, 103ii, Bk XI, p. I?#.
5« Tr, p« 2300,
r* Z9 ^
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As a result of th© }Ianioh Agraement, it -was unnecessary to
carry out "Fall Gruen", Lfieb lad his Army into the Sudetenland
and remained thera until approxmately the middle of Ootober^l
TThen he left actiVe duty* On the Hth of that month, the OKSft
✓ ^
asked all Army headqua±»ters, including Leeh^Sj to report "what
reinforcements are necessary in the present situation in order to
break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia?" 2
Leebts testimory concerning the outbreak of the war in Septem
ber 2-939 is equally evasive and meretricious# He stated that he
was "in retirement" and "did not participate at all'j that, "as a
con:5d.0to surprise to me", he was called to the meeting with Hitler ,
on the Obersalaberg on 22 August 1939? and that from Hitler's re^
marks ho gathered only "the impression tl¥i.t the situation was somo«
... ^
what similar to the situation which prevailed before the invasion of
the Sudetenland and##...that there would be no war". He says that
he based his conclusion upon Hitler's announcement of the nonr-ag«
✓ •
gression pact about to be concluded with Russia, upon Hitler's
• . y
"100^ assurance" that France and England would not intervene, and
Hitler's statement that negotiations with Poland would continue#
He further testified that ho commanded Amy Group C, with the mission
of defending the western front of Germany#3
It is, of course, quite preposterous to imagine that Leob
would have been given such a critical assignment — conm^nd of
/
the entire western front — v;ithout opportunity being afforded
him to acquaint himself with the forces at his disposal, their
y
equipmonb and their resources for defense in general. And, once
y
again, the testimony of the defense witness Haider is quite suf
ficient to demonstrate this absurdity#. Haider testified tfet an
attack from the west had to be antioipeted as a strong possibility
✓
in the event of a Qeman attack on Poland, that the assignment of
protecting Gemany's western frontier was given to Leeb, and must
1# Tr# p.'
2, 388iS, Pros. Exh. 10l;8, Bk XXX, p. 103.
3. Tr# pp. 2301-oU.
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i^ve IcnoTim by then "that the possibility of a military operation
in the west existed and was being anticipated and that it was his
duty in suoh a case to protect the West with a minimum of forces".!
The vital nature of Leeb^s role in the West is set forth in a direct
ive for the conduct of the "vvar issued on 31 August 1939^ "viiich
stated!2
The Arny will hold the Siegfried Line (West Wall) and voll
make preparations to prevent its encirclement in the North
by the Western Povfers invading Belgium or Dutch territoiy.
If French forces should enter Luxembourg^ the frontier
bridges may bo blovm up.
Leeb>s "impression" of Hitler^s remarks on the Obersalzberg is
equally implausible. The noU'-aggression pact with Russia made it
more likely, not less likely, that Hitler would press home his ad«
vantage ruthlessly. Hitler did indicate a hope that England and
France would not intervene, but he gave no "100^ assurance", and in
fact made it quite clear that he would carry through with his plan
for the destruction of Poland regardless of v;hat the v/estern powers
might do. So far from expressing ary.belief ttat negotiations vjlth
Poland would lead to a satisfactory solution, he told the generals
Poland is in a position in which I v/anted her.....I am
only afraid that at the last moment some S^hweinehund
vrill make a proposal for mediation.
Hitler also-made clear his aggressive intentions against the
✓
Western povrers, and his cynical contempt for any rudiment of morali-*
ty in international relations!^
It "was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to
coma sooner of later. I had ala^eady made this decision
in the spring, but I thought that I would first turn a«
gainst the West in a few years, and only afterwards a-
gainst the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One
cannot dose one*s ayes even before a threatening situa
tion. I v/anted to establish an acceptable relationship
with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But
1. Tr. p,,209i;*
2. C»^26g, Pros. Exh. 1099, Bk. XXII, p« 207.
3. 798-K, Pros, Exh, 1101, Bk XIII, p. 215.
Idem., p. 213; lOlU^PS, Pros. Esdi. 1102, Bk XIIX, p. 217.
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. this plan which was agreeable to me^ could not be executed,
sinoa essential points have changed.
Everybody shall have to inake a point of it that v^e were '
determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers.
Struggle for life or death.long period of peaoe would
not do us any good...«.Destruotion of Poland in the^fore
ground.... .Even if war should break out in the West, the
destruction of Poland shall be the primary objectiVG#.i..I
shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the v/ar,
never mind whether it is plausible or not. The victor shall
not be asked, later on, whether vire told the truth or not.
In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters,
but Viotory....«Have no pity. Brutal attitude....,Complete
destruction of Poland is the military aim,.,.,Conviction
that the German Yfehrmaoht is up to the requirements. The
start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.
ks the DfT found, these records of wieit Hitler said to Leeb .and the
other generals show that the final decision for Poland^s destruction .
was reached shortly before 22 August 1939, that a conflict between
Germany and the west was unavoidable in the long run, and that al
though Hitler hoped to be able to avoid a snmltaneous conflict v/ith
✓
Great Britain and France, he fully realized that there was a risk of
this happening but it was a risk which he -was willing to take.l
In the last analysis, the best tY&t can be made out of Leebis
story is that he believed that, if Poland yielded to German demands,
there v/ould have been no v/ar: "If the Polish Corridor question vrould
have been solved in a ne-nner tolerable for us, then no v;ar would have
resulted",^ H^der put it in much the same fashion^ according to him
the preparations for the invasion of Poland "represented a military
means of pressure in order to support his political aiins".3 But even
Haider admitted that the generals "had some reason to believe that
Hitlerts intentions were aggressive",^ and, in any event, the hope
that Poland might succumb to the threat of force without actual fight
ing is no excuse. This was held by the D.ff very squarely with respect
to the defendant Raedert^
The defendant Raeder testified that neither he, nor von
Fritsoh, nor von Blomberg, believed that Hitler actually
1. Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p, 202,
2. Tr. p,-2ia+8.
3. Haider, Tr. p. 2090-.91.
It, Tr. p,'.2089.
5. Vol. I, Trial of the Ifejor War Criminals, p. 191^92^
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meant -war, a conviction v/hioh the defendant Raeder claims
that he held up to 22 August 1939* The basis of this con
viction 7/as his hope that Hitler v/ould obtain a "political
solution" of Gerinany's problems. But all that this means,
when examined, is the belief that Germai^ts position v;ould
be so good, and Germanyis armed might so overvfhelming that
the territory desired could be obtained without fighting for
it. It must be remembered too that Hitler^s declared in
tention Y>rith regard to Austria was actually carried out
TJlthin a little over four montlis from the date of the meet
ing, and within less than a year the first portion of Czecho
slovakia Yijas absorbed, and Bohemia and Moravia a few months
later. If any doubts had existed in the minds of ary of his
hearers in November 1937, after I^rch 1939 there could no
longer be any question that Hitler i^as in deadly earnest in
his decision to resort to v/ar.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that Leeb in his direct
testimony did not discuss the occupation of Bohemia and Moi^vla in
March 1939^ v/hen asked on cross-examination whether he did not regard
the events of Itoch 1939 as a breach of the Munich lact, he replied
that he "lived in retirement at that tine and kept away from all poli**
tics, therefore I did not ponder this question". This from a man who
t ^
had himself led the march into the Sudetenland, who was subject to re—
call in the event of war as one of Germany's greatest military leaders,
and who professes to be deeply interested in questions of morality,
A final vrord should be said v^ith respect to the fact that Leeb's
forces were deployed along the western frontier, and were not ongagod
on Polish territory. His counsel has laid great stress upon this cir-
cumstanoG,^ but in fact it does not touch the issues.. Leeb knew at
this time that the attack upon Poland was aggressive,2 and it is ob
vious that Hundstedt and Book oculd not have attacked in Poland withf
out Leeb Is holding action in the West, In this respect, ,Leeb*s posi
tion was exactly analagous to tl:»t of a baiic robber who stands guard
at the door to fend off interference by the police while his confod03>-
ates rob the bank. It is well settled that such a person is criminally
liable ag a principal^ as has been stated in a leading tescb
on criminal law:^
1, Opening statement of Dr. Latenisor, pp. 33—3U. .
2, Tr,. p,,21^49,
3, Vol. I, Whartonis Grbninal Law (12th Ed.), p. 311.
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No matter how wide may be the separation of confederates,
if they afe all engaged in a common plan for the execution
of felony, and all take their parts in the furtherance of
a common design, all are liable as principals.
Furthermore, Leeb>s position in the Vfest v/as, fundamentally, no dif
ferent from that of Doenitz, German submarine warfare v/as almost
exclusively directed against England and France, and played no part,
- / •'
or at most a very insignificant part, in the fighting with Poland,
but this did not prevent the HIT from convicting Doenitz of committing
crimes against peace at the very outset of the v;ar:l
If
Submarine iTarfare wliich began iimnediately upon the outbreak
of ^Tar, was fully coordinated vdth the other branches of the
Wehrmacht, It is clear that his U-boats, jfev; in number at
the time, were fully prepared to wage "ivar#
The evidence v/ith respect to Leeb's responsibility for the ag-
gressive wars in the Y/est in the spring of Ipli-O is, if anything, even
more conclusive than in the case of Czechoslovakia and Poland, The
extent to vdiich Leeb>s testimony concerning the western campaign can
be relied on is illustrated by the following collbquy betvfeen Leeb
and his counsel on direct eD^aminationi^
Q Fieldraarshal^ before the Polish campaign, did ary plans
of a campaign against France exist?
A I don't know that because I yjas retired then,
Q Yl:^t was the situation after the Polish campaign?
A I don't knovf that either because I was in no iway a
participant,,4,,
Q leren't you present during any discussions and confer
ences concerning the western campaign?
✓
A No, I received orders concerning my Army Group, and I
passed these orders on and transmitted them to the armies
under rry comniand as orders of the Amy Group,
In fact, of coxirso, Loeb commanded one of the three Amy Groups on the
western front, and during the campaign he broke through the L^ginot Line,
captured an entire French Amy Group, and advanced deep into France,^
Ho en^ged in numercus discussions and conferences concerning the west
ern campaign of which the folloiying — a conference on 27 March, 19[tO
VoJ# If TiPiaX of the Major Yfar Criiiiinals, p, 310
2. Tr. p. 2307. ' '
3» fTt p. 2319,
3h
•vri.th Hitler^ 3rauchitsch, Haider^ and Loeb^s subordinate cconmanders^
Witaloben and DoHiaann is but one exampleJ^
1) Generaloberst von Leeb talks on:
a) General situation. Tactical doctrine of Prencii
and German troops.
b) Construction of fortifications^ Yj-ith special em«
phasis on fact tl»t steel must not be stinted at
the vreak spots on both sides of Saarbruecken.
Fuehrer interjected here that his desire to have
the main battle position on the commanding ridges
on the southern banlc of the Saar river Yjas frus
trated only by the out-break of the vmr.
c) Diversionary attack "Golb". Here the assertion
is made that diversionary attacks must not be
initiated on the Rhine front because of the sub
sequent attack at the Upper Rhine. Closing of
Swiss border iS discussed* Oi'fing to coal ship
ments to Italy, the border cannot be '-closed be
fore the actual start of the attack,....
2) Generaloberst von Witzleben talks on Operation "Gelb".
Report is accepted without discussion. In the subset
quent discussion on construction of fortifications^ the'
Fuehrer lays great stress on Artillery soiplacements,....
3) Gen^'Dollmann speaks briefly on situation at Seventh
Arny^ stressing its deficiencies. Outlines three cross
ing operations vfithin Operation "Gelb".....
ti) After ttet, the Fuehrer speaks about the general situ-
atxon.....
In shortj Leeb participated at _the highest level in the plannii^
of aggressivs ivar in the Y/est, and Twas one of the three chief execu
tors of the aggressive plans. There is no issue as to knoYfledge;
Leeb adiTiits that he knew of Hitler*s aggressive intentions,^ and he
attended the meeting between Hitler and the military leaders on 23
November 1939 at Y/hich Hitler declared:^
I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and
quickest moment. Breach of tho neutrality of Belgium and
Holland is meaningless, No one Yri.ll question that Y/hen we
havd Y/on«
Leeb has put forth two defenses. The first is that he joined
with the other German generals in opposing Hitler's plan to atitjaok in
the West iiiiTiiediately after the Polish canipalgn in the fall of 1939.
1. NOKST-31UO, Pros. Exh. 13^9, Bk. XXX, p. 15-6,
2. Tr, p., 2311^2.
3. Vol. Ij Trial of the J.fejor iWar Criminals, p. 210.
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This is quite true^ and the record contains a memorandum which Leoh
submitted to Brauchitsch in October 1939 urging that it would be
Yd^er for Germany to pursue a Y/aiting policy^ and pointing out the
undesirable political re'percussions vfhich a violation of the neutral
ity of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg Y/ould entail.-^ But all of this
is no defense whatsoever. The aggressive ivars in the Yfest Y/ere in
^ ^ ^
fact planned, prepared, and ivaged, and Leeb did in fact knavd.ngly par
ticipate, Before the U.®, the defendants ICeitel and Raeder both
raised a similar "defense of opposition", but the B?r rightly dis-
allovYed it,^ indeed, in a deeper sense Leebis memorandum to Branch-
itsch aggravates his guilt, for it shows that he clearly realized that
a violation of the neutrality of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg
would be looked upon v/ith horror by all neutral states.
In the oase of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, Leeb makes the
further defense that his troops did not invade those countries, since
his entire campaign was fought in Franco, This contention, analagous
to the contention tl^t Leeb^s' troops Y/ore never actually on Polish
sodl, is also stressed by his counsel. The answer, of course, is the
same as in the case of the contention about Poland, Leeb well knew
that the entire design and plan of campaign in the West v/as to over
run the IiOYf Countries and smash the French and British armies. He
✓ ^
confederated Y/ith Bock, Rundstedt and others, and is just as liable
for the criminal attacks on Belgiuiu and Holland as are Bock and Rand?'
stedt themselves
In such caseS of confederacy, all are'responsible for the
acts of each, if done in pursuance of, or as incidental to,
the common design.
Leeb Is crijuinal rGsponsibility for the invasion of the Soviet
Union need not detain us longj the evidence is overwhelming and his
1, Loeb Document Bk III, p, 65.
2, Vol, I, Trial of the Major Vfar Criminals, pp, 289, 316,
3* Vol, I, Wharton's Criminal Law, fl2th Ed,), p, Sliii.,
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attempts at explanation are quito unconvincing. Once again, he com- -
manded one of the tliree Army Crroups involved in the attack, and led
his forces north from IBast Pnissia to Leningrad, The record is replete
with the evidence of his leading role in planning and executing the
✓
invasion, and will bo sot forth in detail in our brief, Leeb defended
his participation on the ground that he ivas mentally opposed to the
attacks, but there is no evidence that his "opposition" ever took ar^
overt form and, in any event, for reasons already stated, his mental
reservations do not constitute a defense, Leeb's_ only other defense
is related to tho question of knowledge. He attended the conferenoe
betv/een the military leaders and Hitler in March 19^41 when Hitler art-
nounced his definite intention to attaclc Russia, and, according to
Leeb, the burden of Hitler's argumont ivas that Russia was about to
attack Geniiany, and that in self-defense Gem^ny would have to launch
a so-called "preventive v,/ar",^
The argumenb that the German attack on the Soviet Union vjas
launched in "self-defense" was also raised before the BE, and wa^
rightly rejected. Since the time of the Bfl? Judgment, additional
evidence presented in this case has abfu.ndantly reinforced the IMT*s
conclusion. It clearly appears, from the Haider Diary and other
documents, tiB.t Hitler decided to attack Russia for two prima^ reas-
onss firstly, in accordance with his long—cherished objective, ex
pounded in Mein Kampf and in his speeches, to win "lebensraum" in the
East and exploit the natural resources of the Soviet Union, such as
grain and oil. Secondly, Hitler was reluctant to undertake militaiy
operations across the channel against England, and concluded that
En^and "^vas holding out and refusing to make peace largely in the hope
that Russia would come to her assistance* The attack against Russia
was, in Hitler's mind, in large part a means to bring England to her
knees. As early as July 19U0, Haider quoted Hitler to ^he effect that
"With Russia smashed, Britain's last hope would be gone, Germany then
1, Tr. p. 2328,
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•would be master of Europe and the Ballcana,"^ Leeb's testimoriy that
Hitler represented the vw against the So-vlet Union as a "preventive
•war" finds absolutely no basis in the record* Leeb and the other
Army Group and Commanders-inGChief were present at a meeting vri-th
Hitler on lU June 19iil> shortly before the Russian can^jaign T/as launched,
p
and Haider suranarized HitlerJs discourse as follows:*^
After lunch, comprehensive political speech by the Euolirer,
in v;hich he gives the reasons for his intention to attack
Russia and develops his calculations that Russians disinte
gration will induce Britain to give up the struggle*
The other goal of destroying the Russian §tate and exploiting
the resources of the Soviet Union yjas also clearly revealed to Leeb and
✓
the other military leaders* At the meeting of 30 March 19£ll,, relied on
✓
by Leeb, Hitler did not say anything about a preventive "war, but on the
contrary made clear the far—reaching objectives of the Russian campaign*
Leeb and the other generals were expressly told a-b this meeting tl^t
the destruction of the State and the oxbemoination of the intelligensia
was part of their task. As Haider put it in his Diary:3 "Our goalis'in '
✓
Russia: crush armed forces, bread up state#••••The indi"vddual troop com
manders must know the issues at stake. They must be leaders in the fight."
The organization and objectives of the elaborate German machinery for the
economonic exploitation of Soviet territory, set up -under Rosenbergis
leadership, wore also well known to the military leaders*
There is not a shred of o-vLdence in the contemporary documents to
support LeobJs defense that the Soviet campaign-was represented to the
Geri^n generals as a "preventive war". As the 11.0? founds^
It v/as contended for the defendants that the attack upon the
U*S*S#R# was justified because'the So-vlot Union-was contem
plating an attack upon Gennany, and making preparations to
tliat end* It is impossible to believe that this view was
ever honestly entertained# - • >
The plans for the economic exploitation'of the U#S#S#R#, for
the removal of masses of the population, for the murder of
Commissars and political loaders,.vrore all part of the caro-
fuUy prepared scheme launched on 22 tAine without i/arning of
any kind, and v/ithout the shadow of legal excuse# It wag
plain aggression#
1, NOICI 3lU0, "Pros. E3di,,.13^9,.Bk XIX, p#., 22, .
2. Idem#, p.'37..
3# HCK.T 3llt0, Proa. Exh^. 1359, Ek XEC, pp« Jl, 33#
Vol. I, Trial of the rl^jor VJar Criminals, p# 2l5,
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2, Schniewind
In turning from Leeb to Schniewind, we not only turn from the Arny
to the Navy, but also from the highest level of planning and execution in
the field to planning and execution at "Navy Department level"» Schniewind
became Chief of a bureau in the OKM in October 1937 > and was fully informed
concerning naval Eearmament# He became Chief of Staff of the Naval War
Staff about the time of Munich, was generalHy informed concerning "Pall
Gruen", and received the directives issued in anticipation of the occupation
of Bohemia and Moravia.^ But the principal charges against Schniewind
under the indictment relates to the aggressive wars against Poland, the
Western powers and the Low Countries, Yugoslavia and Greece, the Soviet
Union and, in particular, Denmark and Norway. , The evidence against Schnie-
vrind parallels very closely the evidence which led to the conviction of
Raeder by the IMT.
In convicting Raeder of the commission of crimes against peace in
connection with the outbreak of war with Poland, France, and the United
2
Kingdom, the IMT stated; "Raeder received.••♦the directives of 'Fall
Weiss' beginning with that of 3 April 1939; the latter directed the Navy
to support the Army by intervention from the sea. He was also one of the
few chief leaders present at the meeting of 23 May 1939* He attended the
Obersalaberg briefing of-22 August 1939«" Schniewind likewise received
the directives on "Fall Weiss" and was present at the well-known meetings
with Hitler on 23 May and 22 August 1939*^ Furthermore, the record in
this case contains many documents showing Schniewind's direct and constant
participation in naval preparations for war with Poland and the western
powers# Schniewind's only defense is the same contention that was made on
behalf of Raeder and Leeb, namely, that he thought Poland might yield to
German demands without fighting; this defense vras rejected by the IMP, and
has already been discussed in our analysis of the evidence against Leeb.
With respect to Raeder's responsibility for the invasion of Denmark
and Norway, the IMT judgment states
1, Tr, pp. ii9U0-Ul.
2, Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 3l9»
3» Tr. pp. U820-i47.
Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 315-16.
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Admiral Karls originally suggested to Raeder the desirable
aspects of bases in Norway. A questionnaire, dated 3 October
1939, which sought comments on the desirability of such bases,
was circulated ;vithin SKL. -On 10 October Raeder discussed
the matter with Hitler; his War Diary entry for that day says
Hitler intended to give the matter consideration. A few months
later Hitler talked to Raeder, Quisling, Keitel, and Jodl; OKVT
began its planning and the Naval YiTa^ Staff worked with OKW staff
officers. Raeder received Keitel's directive for Norway on
27 January 19U0 and the subsequent directive of 1 March, signed
by %tler.
The evidence against Schniewind is substantially the same. Admral Ka^ls*
original suggestion was embodied in a letter to Raeder, and Raeder turned
this letter over to Schniewind "to investigate the military angles of the
problem" and make appropriate recommendations.^ Schniewind was not present
at Raeder*s discussions with Hitler, Quisling, Keitel and Jodl, but was
2
kept fully informed of the tenor of these discussions by Raeder,. Schnie-
(
wind made a second "exhaustive study about the whole Norwegian problem"
at the end of 1939 or the beginning of 19iiO, which "was transmitted to
the OKW."^ When the Special Working Staff to develop the operational
plans was set up, the Navy v/as represented by Captain Krancke, and Sch
niewind saw to it that the SKL furnished Krancke with all necessary inform
ation on the naval aspects of the proposed operation.^ Schniewind, like
Raeder, received the first operational directive, covering the invasion
and occupation of both Denmark and Norway, early in March, 19i;0,^ and
thereafter "the SKL gave the corresponding directive to the subordinate
6
agencies of the Navy".
Schniewind, like Raeder and the other defendants before the IMT,
defends the occupation of Norway on the ground that it was a "preventive
7
measure" to forestall a British occupation, despite the fact that the
entries in the Navy War Diary in October 1939 contain no indication what-
g
soever that fear of a British move was a factor at that time. This con-
9
tention was fully considered and rejected by the IMT. Furthermore,
whatever might be said in this regard with respect to the occupation of
1. Tr. pp. U852-53i
2. Tr. pp. U857-58.
3. Tr. pp. U860-61.
U. Tr. p. ii.862,
Tr. pp. i486^-67«
6. Tr. p. U868.
7. Tr. p. I4872.
8. Tr. p. 14853.
9. Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 206-209,, 316,
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Norway, Schniewind admitted here, in reply to a question by Judge Hale^
concerning the occupation of Denmark, that "even today, I do not know any
1 2
international law justification for this mattery. As the IMT stated:
No suggestion is made by the defendants that there was any
plan by any belligerent, other than Germany, to occupy Den
mark. No excuse for that aggression has ever been offered.
In the course of its opinion convicting Raeder on the charge of
3
crimes against peace, the IMT further stated;
Raeder received the directives, including the inniunerable
postponements, for the attack in the West. In a meeting
of 18 March 19i;l with Hitler, he urged the occupation of
all Greece, He claims this was only after the British
had landed and Hitler had ordered the attack, and points
out the Navy had no interest in Greece, He received
Hitler's directive on Yugoslavia.
Schniewind likewise received the directive in connection with the attack
in the West, and the SKL issued appropriate orders to the suboirdinate naval
agencies to support the- Army by occupying certain Dutch islands and by
laying mines to block off the Dutch coast,^ He attended the meeting of the
military leaders with FH.tler on 23 November 1939^ at which Hitler declared
that he would attack France through Belgium and Holland and that a "breach
of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will quest
ion that when we have won", Schniewind received the directives of December
19hO for the invasion of Greece, and of 27 March 19^0 for the occupation
of Yugoslavia; German naval units accompanied the krmy into Greece to deal
with shipping matters in the Greek ports.^
As the IMT found, Raeder opposed Hitler's plan to invade the Soviet
7
Union, and endeavored to persuade Hitler to change his mind. There is
no reason to doubt Schniewind's testimony that he shared Raeder's views,®
But Schniewind, like Raeder, i-eceived the "Barbarossa" directives, and
the Navy took the"necGssary preparatory measures n ?
1. Tr. p. U918
2. -Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 208.
3. Idem., p, 316.
U* Tr. pp. I4885-86.
5. Tr. p. i;88l4.
6. Tr. pp. U892-9I4.
7. Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 516,
8. Tr. pp. U897-U9OO,
9. Tr, p, U898,
3. Lehmann
The defendant Lehmann was the director of the Legal Department of
the OKW from the summer of 1938 until the end of the war; in 19Ui he was
given the military rank of Generaloberstabsrichter, Although he had no
strategic or tactical responsibilities, the record clearly shows that he
was well informed in advance concerning the Wehrmacht's war plans in order
that he might take whatever preparatory measures were necessary in the
legal field. Thus, when preparations for the attack on Poland were being
made, Lehmann received a copy of a decree dated 3 April 1939> issued by
Warlimont's office, on the subject of "Command Authority in the Operational
Zone of the Arny",^ The purpose of this decree was to define the author
ity of the various governmental agencies, both military and civilian,
which would be carrying on activities in the operational zone, ' Similarly,
only two days after Hitler decided to invade Yugoslavia and a week before
the invasion actually began, Lehmann received a decree signed by Keitel
. 2 .
entitled "Special Instructions Concerning Directive No. 25"« Directive
No. 2$ was the document in which Hitler had first announced that Yugo-
3
slavia had to be "smashed as rapidly as possible". The Keitel decree
received by Lehmann stated that "The Yugoslavian territory to be occupied
by German troops in the course of the operation will be treated as an
operational area of the Army". The German rules for court martial pro
cedure subjected all foreigners and Germans in the operational zone to
court martial Jurisdiction for offenses committed there,^ It is clear
that the Keitel decree was sent to Lehmann so that he would be advised
in advance that he could expect a good deal of new business in his Legal
Department as a result pf the Yugoslavian campaign, and so that he could
prepare himself to take'care of it. He was being asked to do in his own
sphere exactly what the field commanders were being asked to do in theirs —
to take whatever steps were necessary in order to carry out the aggressive
war against Yugoslavia.
1. 0120, Pros. Exh. 1079, Bk XIII, p. 8^.
2. ITUO-PS, Pros. Exh. 1180, Bk XVI, p. U3.
3. C127, Pros. Exh. 1187, Bk XVI, p. 72,
l^. Lehmann Doc, Bk II, p. 11,
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Lebmann was up to his ears in preparing for the invasion of Russia.
He said that Keitel told him in March that "there was a possibility of
a war with Russia".- On March 30th, Hitler announced at a conference
with the military leaders that commissars would be liquidated after cap-
tu^in the forthcoming Russian campaignT^d" also that neither soldiers '
who committed offenses against indigenous civilians nor civilians who had
conmitted crimes against Wehrmacht personnel would be tried by court mar
tial. Shortly after this, according to Lehmann, he received a telephone
call from Keitel's office and was told to write a draft of an order putting
the latter intention into effect. This was the beginning of the infamous
Barbarossa Jurisdiction order. Lehmann worked on this during most of the
month of April. He conferred with Jodl, Warlimont and Mueller and
finally produced a version which was acceptable to Hitler. During this
same period, he received the om draft of the Commissar Order and made
some changes in that, Lehmann turned out his third draft of the Barbarossa
Jurisdiction order on April 28th and he had talked to Keitel and Jodl
about the Commissar Order earlier than that. Lehmann knew that Russia
was shortly to be invaded, he knew that the German occupation of Russia
was to be characterized by practices prescribed by the OKIV which flagrantly
violated international law, and he worked with might and main for three
months before the campaign began to concoct the prescriptions.
The foregoing are merely samples of the type of activity in which
Lehmaxm was engaged in preparing for aggressive wars. The prosecution
suggests that the case against Lehmann under Coionts One and Four is almost
exactly analagous to the case which was established against Funk before
the IMT. Funk, for example, was convicted of making economic preparations
for the aggressive war against the Soviet Union by making plans for the
economic exploitation of the occupied Soviet territory and by planning for
the printing of ruble notes in Germany in order to serve as occupation
currency. Lehmann's activities in the legal field exactly paralleled Funk*s
in the economic field. Neither Funk nor Lehmann was a leading figure in
the origination of aggressive war plans, but each took a substantial part
in his own field.
1. Tr. pp„ 7952-96.
2. Tr. p. 806U.
G. SuMnary
We believe that^ by dealing vath the proof under Counts One and Four
concerning Leeb, Schniewind, and Lehmann, we have met and disposed of all
the defenses which have been raised under these counts. For the most part^
the pattern of defense has changed very little from defendant to defendant,
Thusj the defendant Kuechler more or less parrotted Leeb's highly implau
sible description of the meeting with Hitler of 22 August 1939 at the Ober-
salzberg, Kuechler, indeed, quite outdid his former Commander-in-Chief by
advancing the preposterous suggestion that the non-aggression pact between
Germany and Russia made a war between Germany and Poland very improbable
"because it did not seem to me that it was possible for us to conclude a
treaty with Russia and a few days thereafter attack a state which was on
more or less friendly terms with Russia".^ Just as Leeb claims that he
"did not ponder" the moral or legal significance of the German occupation
of Bohemia and Moravia, so Kuechler brushes it aside as "a political mea-
sure and it was outside my scope to judge it". During the western offen
sive, Kuechler's Eighteenth Army smashed through Belgium and Holland and
ultimately captured Paris. When asked on cross-examination whether he
could justify the violation of the neutrality of the Low Countries, he
3
could on]^ reply:'
It was a political measure which I really didn*t think about
at all, I really don't know what I thought about it then.
,,,,,,I think in a political connection, I really didn't
think about it at all.
Such testimony reveals a brazen indifference to the life, liberty, and
well-being of entire nations that is almost as repellent as the very acts
with which thesa men arc charged. It is exasperating even to spend time
commenting on statements such as these. Certainly Leeb did not consider
this wanton, outrageous and murderous attack on peaceful hnd harmless neigh
boring countries a "political matter outside his scope" when he sent his
. h
memorandum to Brauchitsch in October 1939, and iwrote therein:
1, Tr, ?• 2801,
2, Tr, p, 219$.
3, Tr. p, 29hh.
ii. Leeb Doc, Bk, III, pp, 70-71,
t fiiii-iiaiiii
One cannot help thinking that England and France are
actually waiting for us to do them a favor by attacking,
or even violating, Belgian's and Holland's neutrality. •
The fact that the French took no action whatsoever in
the face of the initial massing of Army Group B form
ations - although they must have known it for a long
time —proves how much they would welcome such an attack.
Such an attack would provide England and France immediately
with the one thing they haven't got up to now, i.e., a force
ful propaganda slogan, and this would even be the best one
imaginable: to defend the Fatherland — even if it is only
the Belgian one I No Frenchman will fail to yield to such
a slogan; everyone will fight for the homeland as soon as it
appears to be threatened by the penetration of German troops
into Belgium*
The British warmongers would like nothing better than our
attack which would give them an excellent excuse to brand us
as the instigators of uni-eat in Europe. More than ever
before will they demand that this instigator be destroyed -
and they will be heeded, to be sure I
•js- ^ ^
Any violation of Belgium's neutrality is bound to drive that
country into the arms of France. France and Belgium will then
have one common foe: Germany, which for the second time with
in 25 years, assaults neutral Belgium I Germany, whose govern
ment solemnly vouched for and promised the preservation of
and respect for this neutrality only a few weeks ago !
If Germany, by forcing the issue, should violate the neutral
ity of Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, a neutrality which
has been solemnly recognized and vouched for by the German
government, this action will necessarily cause even those
neutral states to reverse their declared policy towards the
Reich, which up till now showed some measure of sympathy
for the German cause.
This document is a tribute to Leeb's intelligence but, in the light of
subsequent events, it can hardly serve as a testimonial to his character.
Rather it is an indictment, not only of Leeb, but of nearly every defen
dant in the dock. It conclusively establishes that these men knew that
what they did was wrong. There is, we suggest, no document in the entire
record which is more damning.
I'isf'J
WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITT:
COUNTS TiVO AND THREE
The evidence which the prosecution has submitted in support of the
charges in Count Two and Three of the indictment is very extensive. We
shall not attempt today to'describe again the terrible events which the
documentary evidence so eloquently portrays. The criminal responsibility
of each defendant under Counts Two and Three iirill be established in detail
in the individual briefs. At this time we will content ourselves with
calling to the Tribunal's attention only such portions of the evidence as
are relevant to meet the conglomerations of vague, implausible, and mut
ually contradictory defenses Virhich have been raised under these counts*
A. The "Commissar" Order
Under subdivision A of Count Two of the indidmient, dealing with the
so-called "Commissar Order", Sperrle and Schniewind are not charged. The •
responsibility of Warlimont and Lehmann in connection with the drafting
and distribution of the order, as well as the responsibility of Reinecke
for the execution of the order at prisoner of war camps has, we submit,
been clearly established. The remaining eight defendants ~ Leeb, Kuechler,
Hoth, Reinhardt, S^lniuth, Hollidt, Roques, and Woehler — are all charged
with the distribution and execution of the Commissar Order in their capa
cities as field commanders. All of them have, resorted to substantially
identical excuses and explanations. Once again, we think that these de
fenses can be discussed most expeditiously and clearly by examining the
evidence with respect to a few individual defendants, and for this purpose
we will deal with Leeb, Kuechler and Hoth.
1, I^eb
None of the defendants, including the defendant Leeb, denied the
unlawful character of the Commissar Order,^ Nor does Leeb deny that it
was distributed within his Arn^r Group. On the witness stand, he defended
his conduct with respect to the Commissar Order by testimony to the effects
1. Tr, p, 23ii6.
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a* that he protested against the issuance of the Commissar
Order to Brauchitsch and Keitel;^
b® that he did not himself pass down the Commissar Order to
the Fiftieth Corps or the Army Group Rear Area, which
were directly subordinated to him|^
c# that the Commissar Order was transmitted by OKH directly
to the three Armies under his command — the Sixteenth
Army, the Eighteenth Army, and Panzer Group i;, which was
the equivalent of an Army —^ and that he had no authority
to prevent the further passing down of the Order by the
three Armies
d® that he gave oral directions to the units subordinate to
him that the Order was not to be carried out, and there
after "hoped that it v/ould not be carried out to its full
measure"!^
e* that he was never informed of the reports submitted by his
subordinate units showing that the Order was being carried
out;^
f® that the reports of commissar shootings in the record in
this case only cover a small percentage of all the
coiffiiiissars, and therefore the prder must not have been
carried out in most instances
g® that many, if not all, of the reports of commissar shootings
were deliberately falsifiedj'^ and
h® that many of the commissars reported as shot were in fact
killed in battle®
The prosecution suggests that these so-called "defenses" are miserable
fabrications, and that the record proves incontrovertibly that the Commiss
ar Order was distributed and carried out rd-thin Leeb's Amiy Group, Tfith
Leeb^s knowledge, and resulted in the outright murder of numerous prisoners
of war® We will dispose of these defenses seriatim®
a. The fact that Leeb protested against the Order to Brauchitsch
and Keitel is, of course, no defense if ho in fact distributed and executed
the Order® Like his memorandum to von Brauchitsch advising against the
invasion of Belgium and Holland, those protests merely establish conclu
sively that ho vfas fully aware of the "vmrongful character of his actions®.
1. Tr. pp. 23h6-h9m
2. Tr, p, 2350,
3®^ Tr. p® 23li9®
ii.' Tr. pp® 2350-^2®
Sm ' Tr, p® 2361®
6® Tr® pp® 235U-56®
7® Tr® p® 2359.
8. •• Tr. p 2357,
b» Vifhether or not Leeb personally passed the Commissar Order to
the commander of his Reaf Area^ it is perfectly clear that the Order
reached the Rear Area^ because on 19 December 19Ul^ the 28lst Security
Division, then subordinated to the Rear Area, reported that two commissars
had been shot»^ The headquarters of Leeb^s krmy Group North was the only
headquarters which could have re-issued the Commissar Order to the Rear
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Area» The Fiftieth Corps also reported shootings of commissars# leeb
sought to explain this on the ground that the Fiftieth Corps was, for a
time, subordinated to the Sixteenth Army, and that the Sixteenth Army
may have passed the Commissar Qcder to the Fiftieth Corps at that time#
Whether Leeb himself passed the Order to the Fiftieth Corps, or whether,
knowing that the Sixteenth Army would pass the Order to them he took no
action to prevent this, seems to the prosecution a totally academic question#
c# Generals Busch, Hoeppner, and the defendant Kuechler, who command
ed the three Armies under Leeb^s Army Group, were directly subordinate to
leeb in the chain of command# Leeb testified that all three of them shared
his own view that the Commissar Order was unlawful©^ Leeb could have in
structed them not to pass it down, and there is absolutely no basis in the
record for assuming that the three Generals would not have followed his
instructions# If we are to believe Leeb^s testimony that he himself did
not pass the Order to the Fiftieth Corps and the Rear Area, we must also
conclude that Busch, Hoeppner and Kuechler could have behaved in the same
fashion# But there is no evidence in the record that Leeb made ary attempt
to prevent the army commanders from disseminating the Order#
In fact, the record clearly establishes that Leeb^s Army Group head
quarters issued directives to the subordinate Armies in connection vrith
the execution of the Commissar Order# Leeb's own Chief of Staff signed
and distributed to the Armies and the Rear Area an order dated 2 July 19ij.l,
directing them to destroy all copies of the Commissar Order, and to re
frain from shooting commissars who had previously escaped detection and
JOKVT 215U, Pros, Exh, 27^, Bk 6CD, p# 9#
lOKVf 2179, Pros. Exh# 61;, Bk III, p, 773 NOKW 2207, Pros# Exh, 89
^k III, p, U43# '
'r# .pp# 2360-61#
'r# p# 23^1#
were working in labor detachments v^ith other prisoners. Another document
shows that Leeb's Ic Officer, Jessel, who testified in this proceeding,
directed the lo Officer of Kuechlerts Eighteenth Arir^r to screen prisoner
collection points for commissars who had escaped detection by removing
2
their insignia,
d, "While there is no reason to doubt Leeb's testimony that he dis
approved of the Commissar Order, there is absolutely no evidence that he
took any action which was effective, or could have been e^^ected to be
effective, to prevent its execution within his Army Group. leeb, like
almost all other German generals who have been charged with or questioned
concerning their part in the Commissar Order, claims that he gave oral in
structions that it should be disregarded. But since the documents in the
record clearly establish that numerous commissars were shot by units xmder
Army Group North pursuant to the Orderj it is clear that either leeb gave
no such oral instructions or that they were totally ineffective,
e, Leeb Is testimony that he did not learn of the reports concerning
the shootings of commissars pursuant to the Order is totally incredible*
If we ch-e to believe Leab's statements that he repeatedly protested against
the Order to von Brauchitsch and Keitel, that he expressed his views to
the subordinate army commanders, and that upon other occasions at the front
he expressed his disapproval of the Order and made inquiries concerning
its effect,^ then it stands to reason that the staff of the Army Group
must have loiovm that leeb was deeply concerned about the Order and would
siu-ely have brought to his attention the reports showing that it was being
executed in spite of his own oral instructions* But, in any event, as
u
was rightly held by Tribunal V in the "Hostage" casei
An army coiranander will not ordinarily be pemitted to dea:y
knowledge of reports received at his headquarters, they being
sent there for his special benefit* Neither will he ordinarily
be permitted to deny knowledge of happenings v/ithin the area
of his command while he is present therein# It would strain
the credulity of the tribune.l to believe that a high—ranking
militaiy commander would permit himself to get out of touch
with current happenings in the area of his ccaranand during
war time*.
1. NOKW 3136, Pros* .Ebch* ,15U7, Bk XKxI> p* 3U*....
2, NOKVf 31U5, Pros.,Exh*. 1553^ Bk XXII, p* 57«,
3* Tr. pp# 2351"52,
U* United States v* List, et al*,. (Gas© No* 7), Tr, p, lOUol* .
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f* leeb^s argument concerning the percentage of captured ccimnissars
covered by the reports of shootings is an especially weird fabrication*
He testified that two of the Armies under him — the Sixteenth and the
Eighteenth — captured over 200^000 prisoners, estimated that, for 200,
000 Russian prisoners there should have been 2,000 to 2,^00 commissars,
and contrasted this figure with the 96 comjfiissars covered by the reports
of shootings*^ From this, he concludes that the Gonimissar Order was
carried out only occasionally.
It is true that, in the setting of this case vrith millions of
Jews being slaughtered and hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners
dying of exhaustion and starvation the figure 96 does not loon very
large. But the suggestion that responsibility for 96 murders is some
thing to be passed over lightly is, we submit, monstrous. Furthermore,
Leeb's elaborate and speculative calculations are shown to be entirely
without foundation by the very evidence which the defense siiDmitted, By
no means all of the commissars who had been fighting with the 200,000
prisoners were captured alive; mar^ of them were killed in action. The
defense witness Gersdorff testified that mai^ commissars committed suicide
2
rather than suffer captiure. He also testified that the Commissar Order
3
became knovfn on the Russian side, and that thereafter most of the comm
issars removed their insignia in an effort to avoid detection,^ and were
not recognized as comriiissars by the troops. This testimony is confirmed
by the entry in Halder*s diary for 1 August 19h1f which reads5^ "Treat
ment of captured political commissars (most of them are not detected be
fore arrival in Hf camps)". Considering that commissars were being Icilled
in battle, committing suicide, and disguising their Identity, and that no
doubt the prosecution's collection of reports of commissar shootings is
far from complete, Leeb's calculations are seen to be v/orthless4
1. Tr, pp, 235U"^6,
2. Tr, p, 2179#
3. Tr, p. 2160.
U, Tr, p, 2l6ii.,
Sr NOKWr 3lU0, Pros,,.Exh. 1359, Bk XIX, p*.
. I I iii'ixi-
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Y'Jhen desperately pressed^ men are often driven to inconsistencies,
and Leeb^s testimony that the reports of commissar shootings were false
reports is a good example of just such an inconsistency. He suggested
that the reports were concocted in order to cover up the non—execution of
the Commissar Order, by lulling the higher authorities into the belief that
it was being carried out«^ Yet, only a few minutes before he had argued
vehemently that the reports of his Sixteenth Army, which covered the shoot
ing of only seventeen commissars out of an estimated 1,200 to 1,500 cap
tured, "reveal of necessity that the order on the whole was not carried
out,"^ If these reports show so clearly that the Commissar Order was not
being carried out, it is impossible to believe that they were fabricated
for the purpose of deluding someone into thinking that it was being carried
out. Surely, in fabricated reports, the number of commissars reported
executed would have been set high enough to carry conviction, rather than
so low as to suggest the probability of general disobedience®
It is abundantly clear, in short, that the reports of commissar exe
cution are not "faked", but are entirely trustworthy reports of commissars
executed® That are "faked" are not these reports but both of Leeb*s de
fenses with respect to percentages (f») and fabricated reports (g®)| these
defenses are not only spurious but mutually inconsistent,
h, Leeb's final contention is that the reports do not show commissar
esfficutions, but only commisBars killed in battle. These reports, chameleo]n»-
like, now have three natures, each inconsistent with the other two# This
latest guise is particularly transparent, and is disproved by the very
wording of the reports. Thus, many of them carefully distinguish between
u
cormnissars "shot" (erschossen) and "killed in action" (gefallen). On
27 September 19Ul, the XXVIII Corps of Kucchler's Army reported:
On 25 September, the Battalion Commissar Kanajew (110th
Railway Protection Regiment of the 2nd NKWB Division) was
found asleep on the bank of the Tossna near the mouth of
this river. He was taken prisoner and shot after a thorough
interrogation#
1, Tr, p, 2359,,
2, Tr. p, 235U.
3« E.g#, NOKlMll?^ I^os, Exh# 61, Bk III* p# 3o#.
it,. NOKW-2096, Pros, Exh, 88, Bk III, p» IJj-O*.
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other reports by the same Corps stated:
On 18 and 19 September, troop operations were carried out
in the woods of Novo Lissino by the Corps Signal Battalion
and that many prisoners were brought in» Among the prisoners
was a Commissar who claimed to be an Intendant of the second
ranic* It was possible to convict him by papers found on his
person and he was shot#
These are a few examples only of many reports which, by their wording,
completely disprove Leeb^s contention that these commissars were killed
in battle, and prove beyond a shadow of a doubt the obvious fact that when
commissars were reported "shot", "liquidated", or "taken care of", it was
meant that the commissars had been executed after capt\ire pursuant to the
clear language of the Commissar Order#
2, Von Kuechler
The defendant von Kuechler's course of e^qslanations with regard to
the Commissar Order began in June 19I46, at vfhich time he signed an affi
davit under oath which was submitted to the International Military Tribunal
in connection Yfith the indictment of the General Staff and High Command
as a criminal organization# In this affidavit, von Kuechler swore
Commissar Order: I never held this order in'ray hands^ whether
it ever reached my agency, I do not know; whether and in what
manner troop commanders were informed of it, I cannot state#
1.^ then commander-in-chief, Field Marshal von Leeb, I met
several times on the battlefield# We never discussed an
order concerning special measures against political corainissars#
Faced with the documentation in the record of this case, there has
been a prodigious sharpening of von Kuechler*s recollection. On the vdt-
ness stand here he clearly remembored that he received the Order direct
from OKH, that he found the Order repugnant, that he knew the Army Group
Commanders shared his views, that he immediately discussed the Order with
von Leeb "whom I met more frequently in those days", that he caused his
Chief of Staff to lodge a protest with the Chief of Staff of the Army
1. NOKW-1580, Fros# Exh, 670, Bk XXD, p# 321.
2, Tr. pp. 2923^h»
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Group, and that he passed it down to his subordinate commanders at a
"tacticaX conference which had alreac^y been called at Tilsit in East
Prussia"
Kuechler's defenses are, in general, the same as those of leeb* He
testified that, at the conference with his subordinate commanders, he
"expressed repudiation" of the Crder and advanced the opinion that it would
2
be detrimental to discipline^ that he never learned that any commissars
o
were being shot pursuant to the Crder^ that his Ic Officer (Jessel) never
showed him s.ny of the reports concerning the shootings of commissarsj and
that probably the commissars reported shot were in fact killed in action^
'He adopted Leeb^s argument that the low nuiiber of commissars reported shot
shows on its face that the Order v/as not carried out. In fact, his testi—
mopy follows Leeb faithfully from inconsistency to inconsistency.
Kuechler admits that he passed the Order dov/n to his subordinate
commandersi he claims that he had no alternative: "Of course I could not,
as it were, embesale the Order. I couldn^t v/ithhold it. I had to make it
known.On cross-examination, he said that he had to pass it down be
cause "I did not want to be endangered of being regarded as a disobedient
commander".'^ But was Kuechler in fact under any pressure to pass it down?
Leeb, according to his testimony, did not pass the Order down to the Fif
tieth Corps or the Hear Area, Kuechler knew that Leeb was opposed to the
Order, and can hardly have feared that leob would take ar^ action to make
him pass it down, or any disciplinary action should he refrain from pass
ing it down. Before the Dff, Dr* Laternsor claimed that many of the Amgr
Group and Amy Commanders-in-Chief "did not pass this Order on to their
troops at all", and that Fieldmarshal Rdnmel burned the Commander Order
"on account of his personal opposition to it" rather than pass on to his
g
subordinates an order which he knew to be unlawful. But Kuechler did not
1. Tr, pp. 2829-31.
2., "Tr, pp. 2831-32.
3. Tr. p. 2833.-
U. 'Tr, pp. 2833, 3^.
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want to be a "disobedient coimnander"* Rather, he preferred to pass down
to his subordinates an order v/hich he Imew to be unlawful and which called
for the commission of murder® Whatever ccmnients he may have made about
the order to his subordinates were ineffective to prevent its execution
in numerous instances by units under Kucchler*s command® Kuechler^s re
sponsibility for these murders is as clear as Leeb's®
3. Hoth
In the cases of Leeb and Kuechler, we have observed the execution of
the Commissar Order on the northern sector of the Russian front® The de
fendant Hoth 'vvas in the central sector, in command of Panzer Group 3 in
von Bock's Array Group® He admits that he received the order and that he
passed it davm to his si±)ordinate corps commanders — "The fact that it
was passed on by me is beyond any doubt"®^ Hoth seems to say that he dis
approved cf the Order, but, unlike leeb and Kuechler he does not claim
that he gave any oral expression to his disapproval when passing the Order
2down® Instead, he advanced the exbraordinary view that his subordinate
commanders and his troops knew that Hoth would disapprove of such an order
even though ho did not say so, and that therefore they would not carry the-
Order out, even though he had passed the Order down to them without quali-
•3
fication of any Idnd®
If Hoth really believed that his officers and men would feel them
selves to be at liberty , to disregard the Order; if he actually thought
that the tens of thousands of men in his command would be so sensitive
to telepathy as to detect an objection on Hoth's part which he was care
ful not to voice; if he thought that the stern discipline and the military
traditions of the German Ainiy would have the effect of causing its members
to disobey an explicit command; - if Hoth really believed all those things,
ho needod only to road the constant flow of reports coming into his head
quarters- to become quickly disenchanted. According to these reports, his
troops began killing commissars on June 22 - the first day of the campaign®
1® Tr. p, 3081,
2® Tr. p® 3087.
3» Tr. p. 3086®
That day, the 20th Infantry Division reported to the XXXIX Motorized Corps
that one conimissar was killed^ and followed that up the next day TTith a
similar message^^ On June 30, the 12th Rinzer Division reported that "A
political coiranissar holding the ranlc of Colonel was taken prisoner# He
2
was shot as ordered"# This report, like many others, by its language
excluded the standard excuse that the commissars included in these docu
ments were merely killed in battle# Commissar shooting activity by the
troops of the 20th Panzer Division continued to be brisk throughout the
month of Ju]y» On the 6th, the Ic officer reported to Panzer Group 3 on
the enemy situation# Among the things included in this narrative was the
"interrogation of a Soviet Russian Coimnissar and shooting of same"# On
the 18th, he reported that "Approximately tv/enty cominissars were shot by
the division "within a two-weeks period"#
A good deal has been said in this covirt about how the Commissar Order
gradually bocomo obsolete because of lack of enthusiasm for its enforcement
by the very officers who handed it down in the first place# It was not
allowed to become obsolete within Panzer Group 3# On August 8, Hoth's
Intelligence Officer compiled an intelligence bulletin which was sent to
every unit vd.thin the Panzer Group dov/n to battalion level, and which
3
included the followingj
In accordance with new Soviet regulations, all regiments and
divisions, as well as higher staffs, ha-ve now commissars
(formerly political commissars), while companies, batteries and
troops have political leaders (Politruks) who also fall under
the classification of war commissars. Individual inquiries
on the part of the troops make it necessary to point out again
that there "will be no change in the treatment of these persons#.
This intelligoncG bulletin was distributed by Hoth*s Chief of Staff# Aside
from the fact that it shows that the troops were being ordered a second
time to kill captured coimnissars - and completely explodes Hoth's elabor
ate theory that the Order was not carried out because he had never lent
his approval to it —it shows conclusively that the troops had been carrying
out the ComiBissar Order# If these figures of executed commissars were, as
1# mm 22U6> Pros# E3di, 62^ Bk lit, p.'UO,
2# NOKW 22U5^ Pros# Exh# 69, Bk III, p#' 91#
3. NOM 2239, Pros# Exli# 70, Bk III, p. 93.
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Hoth would have us believe.^ merely figments of some officer's imagination,
and if, in fact, the troops had not boon executing these men after cap
ture, there would have been no "individual inquiries^ on the part of the
•troops". There certainly v^ould not have been a reply to these inquiries
by the Chief of Staff of Panzer Group 3? instructing the troops to continue
treating commissars as they had been doing in the past, but to accord
members of the GPU and of the border guards the same treatment as was
given to ordinary soldiers,#
Finally, other records of Hoth's Panzer Group 3 once again demolish
the concocted excuse that the reports of shootings were fabrications and
that the Order was in fact not carried out. In an activity report by the
Intelligence Officer of Panzer Group 3, vvritten in the fall of 19Ulj the
1
following appears:
The special treatment of political commissars by the Armed
Forces resulted in its becoming known to the Russians and
in the strengthening of their ivill to resist. To prevent
its beir^ knoYm., the special treatment should have been
performed only in camps located far back in the rear. Most
of the captured Red Army men and officers are aware of such
a special treatment, of v/hich they said they had learned from
routine orders and from political comriissars who had escaped#
Ona of the witnesses for the defendant Leeb tried to suggest that
this very natural fear which overttok Russian cornmissars was due to "Russ—
2
ian propaganda"# But the document quoted above shows conclusively that
the commissars becamo alarmed, not because of propaganda, but because
they soon discovered what fate was in store for them if they were captured#
All along the front, German officers and men were being captured and
interrogated by the Russians, and Russian officers and men were being
captured and interrogated by the Germans; sometimes, as the document
quoted above shows, commissars were captured by the Germans, and then
escaped and rejoined the Red Army# What was it that frightened these
commissars? Was it an ugly rumor that Hitler had issued an order for their
execution, but that all tho Gorman officers and men were opposed to it on
the basis of international law and were "quietly sabotaging" it? Is that
1# mm 190U, Pros# Exh,. 6?,. Bk III, p# 8I|#.
2# Gersdorff, Tr#. p#. 2171»
ritii' fi'-ini •
why, as late as the spring of 19U2, Russian coimnissars "were fighting
for their very lives" Is that why the commissars often committed sui-
2
cide, or removed their insignia? Did all these things happen because
commissars were pot being killed? We suggest that common sense and the
evidence in this case furnish the answer^
Smcimaiy
Your honors, here is an order issued by the High CoHuiand of the Genmn
Army which ordered and directed the coriimission of murder on a large scale^
•All the defendants knew this 5 every officer and man in the German Amy
who handled the order knew it too# The defendants passed it down to their
subordinates, ^-nd as a. result many murders were committed by troops under
their command*
The mere i^assing down of this order was a criminal actj the defendant
Raeder was convicted by the International Military Tribunal of having
committed vicar criines largely because he passed the commando order "down
through the cha.in of command"# Military Tribunal V, in the Hostage case,
convicted Rendulic of passing down the Commissar Order, although there
was no proof in the record in that case that aiy commissars were shot by
the troops of Rendulic*s division#^
Tribunal V also convicted von lyeser in corinection with the Commissar
OrderLeyser coimuanded a Division in the defendant Reinhardt's Corps^
and three reports by leysor's Division shovred that his troops had in fact
shot commissars, pursuant to the Order* The evidence against the defen
dants here is infinitely more extensive and compelling than the evidence
against Leyser and, needless to say, their responsibility as Army Group,
Army, Corps commanders was far greater than that of Divisional comman
ders such as Rendulic and von Leyser#
These commanders vfere under an affirmative duty to direct and control
their subordinates in such a manner as to prevent violation of the laws of
war by troops under their command* The obligation of a commander "to
1* Gersdorff, Tr, p. 2l62#
2, Tr, pp# 216U, 79#
3* Vol# I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p# 317#
U* United States v# List, et al#, (Gas© Np. ?•), pp» 10509'-10»
0* Idem, pp# 1O02U-20#
control the operations of the members of his command" was discussed at
length and firmly recognised by the Supreme Court in the Yamashita case,^
2
and, as was held by Military Tribunal V in the Hostage case:
Those responsible for such crimes by ordering or authorizing
their commission, or by a failure to take effective steps to
prevent their execution or recurrence, must he held to account
if international law is to be anything more than an ethical,
code, barren of any practical coercive deterrent.
But the defendants are not accused here only of sins of omission,
regardless of how grave an offense their failure to take preventive action,
without more, may be. These men participated affirmatively in the commission
of these murders by puttir^ the Order into the hands of their subordinates.
These defendants, or members of their staff, took further steps to insure
the exBCution of the Order, by passing down supplementary directives in
connection therewith. Their guilt for those crimes has been established
beyond any shadow of a doubt, and the crirae for which they bear this guilt
is the criiue of murder,
B, The "Commando" Order
We turn now to the Commando Order,. The events which preceded its
issuance were various raids carried out between 19 August and 6 October
I9I1.2 by English Commando units on Dieppe, .the island of Sark, and various
installations in Nonvay,^
On 7 October a German radio broadcase announced that "all terror and
sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices who do not act like
soldiers but like bandits, have, in the future, to bo treated as such by
the German troops, and they must be slaughtered ruthlessly in combat
wherever they turn up",^ The next day the defendant Warllmont direct^
the Legal Department of the OIOT, headed by the defendant Lehmann, to draft
a formal order, Lehmann's assistant, Dr, Huelle, complied with this re-
d
quest and telephoned the text of a draft back to Warlimont on the same day,
Warlimont then sent it to the office of Foreign Counter-intelligence under
1, In re Yamashita 66 Sip,, Gt,. 3^0 (19U6),
2, United States v. List,, et al,, (Case No, ?), p, 10it56,
3, 516-BS, Bros, Exh, lUt, Bk IV, p»..89.
ii. 1266^PS, Pros, Exh, 118,. Bk IV, p, 8,,,
5, Ibid, p, 9,
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Admiral Ganejris and asked for his coEments* Canaris immediately objected
to the Legal Departraent draft, root and branch. It allowed the troops
to determine for themselves whom they should shoot after capture. Canaris
said that a definite criterion should be laid downj that the German troops
should be restricted in the exercise of this order to commandos who were
either in civilian clothing or in German uniform.^ Had this modification
been adopted, the whole meaning and effect of the order would, of course,
have been altered.
But Canaris suggested an even more radical change. The Legal Depart
ment draft provided that comiaandos who fell into German hands outside of
combat should be interrogated iimnediately and then handed over to the SD#
Canaris wanted such people to be placed in special confinement after cap
ture-, to be reported to the Foreign Counter-intelligence Office, and to
01
3
2
be. tried by courtSHnartial'. Canaris also pointed out that reprisals
against prisoners of war were absolutely forbidden.
Lehmann now says that he and Canaris were working hand-in-glove trying
to mitigate the effect of this criminal order. It has become fashionable
in this trial for the defendants to hide behind Canaris at every turn.
The evidence shows that Lehmann* s way of ivorking with him was to disagree
with the principal objections which Canaris had raised to the Legal Depart
ment draft,- Lehmann argued that Section 23c of the Hague Convention, which
forbids the killing of an enemy who lays down his arms and surrenders, did
not extend to commando troops because "such methods of warfare had not
ij
been thought of at the time this Article was formulated", Lehmann also
argued that reprisals against prisoners of war were not absolutely prohib
ited but that they depended on reciprocity. It is also significant that
Lehmann never once objected in the course of this extensive correspondence
to anything except the criticisms and reservations which Canaris had ex
pressed, Aliuost every sentence in the draft which issued from Lehmann's
office on 8 October was siibsequently incorporated into the final order.
With the various opinions before him, t^arlimont elaborated upon
1, •126L|.-PS, Eros, E^th., 119, Bk IV,. p. l3
2, Ibid. ^
3, 1265-FS, Eros, Exh., 121, Bk IV, p. 19»
ii. Ibid, p. 20.
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the legal Department draft and sent it to Jodl. Warlimont's version was
followed alMoet paragraph by paragraph in the order v^ich Hitler signed
on 18 October, although it was farther edited by Jodl and Keitel and,
to a certain extent, by Hitler himself. There were six paragraphs in the
final version. The first paragraph was worded by Hitler, but the argument
used there that commando warfare was outside the Geneva Convention origin
ated with Lehmann. The second one was Tnritten entirely by Warlimont and
the third was a joint effort in which Hitler, Keitel and.Jodl supplemented
and extended what Warlimont proposed. The fourth, again, was solely War-
iimont's work#
The illegality of the Comra^-ndo Order is clear, and has been estab
lished by the decision of the JM and by the opinion in United States v#-
V '^ilhalm List, et al. Lehmann himself said on the stand that he considered
the order to have been an "inadmissable reprisal" to the extent that it
applied to uniformed military personnel^ "Graf Leicester hat nicht immer
so gesprochen". His argument concerning the inapplicability of Section
23g of the Hague Convention was concocted for the specific purpose of
furnishing an excuse for murdering captured soldiers who were in proper
uniform#
After the order had been re-edited for the last time and signed by
Hitler, Warlimont distributed it to the three branches of the Wehrmacht,
which in turn passed it on to the field cormiianders#. As was to be expected,
it was not long before teletype messages reporting the murders of captured
commandos began to pass over Warlinont's desk#. He helped formuilate the
answers i^lch had to be made to the protests sibsequently filed by the
British# Warlimont began to occupy himself with such matters less than
a month after the order had been issued, and continued to busy himself
with correspondence concerning the execution of the Comniando Order until
at least July 19lj-l4#^ After the Allied landing in France, Rundstedt, the
Commander—in-Ohief V'/'est, requested instructions as to how the Coimnando
Order should be applied# yiTarlimont answered him by saying that it "remains
basically in effect even after the enemy landing in the Vilest#" •A few
days later, a foamial order to this effect was drafted by Warlimont*s
Quartermaster Staff and initialed by him, after niiich it was signed by .
Keitel arxi passed on to the field ccimnanders#
The line taken by those defendants who were field commanders is
that the order^ even if it was passed on to them, had no application in
the East. Hoth, for example^ made the sardonic observation that he was
fighting in the steppes south of Stalingrad when he heard the German
radio announcement of 7 October and that he did not anticipate seeing
any British Commando troops there* Roques, whose sense of humor did not
ilse to this pitch, owlishly stated that for his part he did not consider
the Commando Order to be applicable because it referred only to Europe arsd
iLfrica, whereas he was in Asia at the time he received it«^
To a certain extent, we agree that the order did not have the same
effect in Russia that it had in the West, The reason that it did not
bring about a radical innovation in the treatment of captured prisoners
of war in Russia is that long before it was issued the German troops had
been shooting captured paratroopers and members of sabotage units# These
classes of troops are included regularly on the SD lists of liquidated
2
persons# This was done by virtue of other orders which had been issued
3
from the outset of the Russian campaxgn#
But the evidence shows that it is certainly not correct to say that
the order was only of academic interest to field commanders in the East#
For example, an entry in the War Diaicy of Relnhardt*s Third Panzer licmy
for 18 November 19h2 — exactly one month after the Commando Order was
issued — reads
Various difficulties have arisen concerning the execution
of the Fuehrer order of 21 October relative to the shooting
of terrorists and groups of bandits. The Panzer Army asks
the Army Group to clarify above all, whether this order meroOy
concerns British terror groups or whether it also applies'to
the other bands in the occupied area# In this connection, the
Ariiiy takes the attitude that, until a new OKW decree is
published, which is in prospect, all bandits are to be shot
to dea.th even if they wear uniforms#
The order issued by the Third Panzer iirmy the next day provided:^
1. "Tr. p# 53?0. , H
2# NOM 27U7, Pr'os. Exh. 7^2, Bk IX, p.
3# mm 2626, Pros# Exh# 2)49, Bk VI-iiB, p# -39#
U. mm 3U82, Pros, Exh. 1|6, Rebuttal Bk II, p#.i;3»
5. NOKW 27U6, pros. Exh. 7U8, Bk IXr-I^ p# 29#
Until new regulations of OKW are published, bandits who
surrender voluntarily without being forced by circumstances,
v>rill be treated as prisoners of war© All other bandits,
including the uniformed ones, will be shot*
Similarly, on 29 October, the Chief of Staff of Salmuth*s Second iirmy
asked the iumy Group to "clarify", in connection with the Commando Order,
whether the German troops were required to massacre all deserters from
partisan units who surrendered. These examples are sufficient to show the
participation of the defendants in carrying out this order and, incident
ally to es^jlode the contention that it had no relation to the war in
Russia.
We have thus gone further in our proof than we needed to go. It ' 'ii
I i-'yi
was not necessary to show that the Comiiiando Order was carried out in order
to show the commission of a crime. The mere transmittal of such an order
to subordinate units is sufficient, as was held in the cases of Raeder
and Rendulic, mentioned above in connection with the Commissar Order.
/
This was done by the defendants Kuechler, Reinhardt, Salmuth and Reinecke.
They are all guiltier than was Doenita, who was convicted by the IMT be
cause he "permitted the order to remain in full force when he became
Commander-in^hief, and to that extent he is responsible".^ Warlimont
and Lehmann, of course, as the draftsmen of the Commando Order, are crim
inally responsible for all the murders committed thereunder, whether in
the East or in the West.
0. Other Crimes Against Prisoners of War
paragraphs $0 to 57 of Count Two of the indictment charge all the
defendants except Schniewind v/ith other crimes against prisoners of war.
An abundance of evidence has been introduced in support of these charges.
It will be sumr.io.ri2;ed with respect to each individual defendant in our
briefs, and we will limit ourselves here to a very few brief observations.
The defendants have relied heavily on the circumstance that the
Soviet Union was not a party to the Geneva Convention with respect to the
treatment of prisoners of war, but it is well settled — and was so
i« Voi. i. Trial of the I'fejor War Criminals, p. 31ii.
held by the IMT — that the general principles of international law with
respect to the treatment of prisoners of yfex were applicable as between
Germany and the Soviet Union# The German High Command was fully a,ware of
this, and Admiral Canaris of the OM set forth this viewpoint in a memor
andum of 15 September 19Ul protesting against proposed regulations for
the treatment of Soviet prisonerso^ Under these well—established principles,
war captivity is not a "punishment" and prisoners of war are not fit ob
jects for revenge or reprisals® They must not be siibjected to dangerous
employment, nor required to work against the interests of their own country
by being forced to engage in any type of labor directly related to war
operations®
There are mary documents in evidence showing that,Russian prisoners
of war were regularly employed to clear mines® The reason given in one
of the orders which required this was that the use of prisoners of war for
2
this purpose was "to spare German blood"® Another ingenious practice
which was engaged in was billeting prisoners of war in buildings which the
Germans were to occupy if it was suspected that they might contain mines
or bobby-traps®^
Another regular occupation of these prisoners of war was to engage
h
in the loading and unloading and transportation of munitions.® Prom
time to time, as could be expected thdse prisoners of war were killed
while so employed®^ But the object of the order which committed them
to this work was carried out: German blood was spared®
The most widespread use of prisoners of war was made in the course
of constructing fortifications® There is hardly a field commander in the
dock whose troops did not use prisoners of war to construct trenches,
anti-tank ditches and field positions of various kinds. Salmuth did it
in France juSt as Hoth did it in Russia®
Yathout trying to make this catalogue more complete, we pass on to
a related topic — the general murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of
1. Vol» I, Trial of the i4ajor Yfar Criminals, p® 232
2, NOKVf 1527. Pros.® Exh, I80, Bk V, p® 20; NOKW 2251, Pros,® Exh® 18?,
Bk V, p® £1*
3® NOKyir 2337, Pros.® E3di® 168, Bk V, p. Ult; NOKW 3337., Pros, Exh. 3^,-Ro-
buttal Bk'I, p® U.®
U# NOKSf 2966^ Proa® Exh® 13U6, Bk V, Sipp® b, p® 5.#
5. mm I9UI, Pros.® Exh. 208, Bk V, p. 132#
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war» It is clear from the reports ajid orders in evidence here that the
German Army followed a consistent policy of shooting all Soviet prisoners
of war who had attempted to escape and had been recaptured. But it is
well settled under the laws of v/ar that it is not a criminal offense for
a prisoner of war to attempt to escape and that, if he is recaptured, he
is only to be subjected-to such disciplinaiy measures as. security and the
prevention of further attempts may require. The execution of a prisoner
of war merely because he has attempted to escape and been recaptured is
strictly prohibited by the laws of war, and is murder#^ And the record
in this case contains a multitude of reports vdiich follow one another in
an endless procession showing that Soviet prisoners of war who had escaped
frcm confinement were shot as soon as they were retaken.
The treatment which Russian prisoners of war habitually received
while in German custody is one of the most appalling parts of this appall
ing case® In connection with the Commissar Order, we have already men- V
tioned that the inmates in the prisoner of war cages were screened for
the purpose of removing those of them who fell within the meaning of that
lethal ordinance# But the screening process went much further# All the
prisoners of war were put into one pf several classifications,.. Into the
first of these throe classifications fell ethnic Germans, Ukranians, and
natives of the three Baltic countries. Into the second fell Asiatics,
Jews and German-speaking Russians# The third category consisted of persons
classified as "politically intolerable and suspicious elements, commissars
and agitators"#
Theoretically, the treatment was to vary according to the classifi
cation# The first group was earmarked for service as auxiliaries of the
German Amy and, sometimes, even as combat troopsj the third group was
considered as temporary boarders who \(gtq to survive only until firing
squads could be organized# The Jews wore taken care of by the extermin
ation squads of the Einsatzgruppen, and the remainder was scheduled to
be shipped to Germany to work in the armament industry or to operate
anti-aircraft guns#
1# The general principles governing escaped prisoners of war are set out
in Sections SO to 5h of the Geneva Conventionj^
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These were the eventual fates which the German authorities had in
mind, but before any given prisoner of war could fulfill this destiny-
he had to contrive to stay alive long enough for the plans of his captors
to be carried out. This was no mean feat. It will never be known how
many millions of Russian prisoners of war died in the Dulags and Stalags
within the jurisdiction of these defendants. The Oberquartiermeister of
Kuechler^s Eighteenth Army said in November 19iil that 100 men were dying
daily within the Aimy area, A little later it was disclosed that all the
inmates of one camp there vrere expected to die within six months at the
outside. At about the same time the Oberquartiermeister of Hoth<s Seven
teenth Army reported that deaths among prisoners of war within his juris
diction were approximately a day, Rosenberg wrote Keitel in February
19li2 that "the fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is a tragedy
of the greatest extent. Of 3.6 millions of prisoners of war, only several
hundred thousands are still fully able to work",
lf?hat we have said about the illegal use of prisoners of war for 3hbor
and about the care and treatment furnished them while they were in German
custody applies primarily to what took place in the operational area while
these prisoners were still under the control of the field commanders. The
story of what happened to those of them who survived long enough to be
shipped to Germany is a history in itself. The food which they received
after they had a.rrived in the Reich was still inadequate to sustain life,
particuleu'ly when these sick and half-starved prisoners were allocated to
work \vhich demanded strenuous physical exertion, liVe have mentioned that
thousands of Russia prisoners of T/eur were drafted to man anti-aircraft
batteries} the court will remember the testimony of the vfitness Erh?j:*dt
Milch in this connection. Thousands of others were assigned to work in
various a.rmamGnt plants in Germany, These included not only Russians,
but French prisoners of war and Italiej:i military internees as well, A
description of the conditions under vdiich some of these men were kept can
be found in the judgiiient of Tribunal III in the Krupp case. The man most
responsible for the plight of prisoners of war in Germany was the defendant
1, United States v, Alfrled ICrupp,. et al,, (Case No, 10) pp, 6l-^8j
' ' ^
Reinecke. In almost every wax crimes case where the question of the
starvaTion^ln^treatment and illegal use of prisoners of war has been an
issue, Roinecke^s name has played a prominent part. The number of victims
of the system "fThich he established and administered is incalculable, a
*' ^ ^ vrt -f-he very outset
has already been shown, he knew fully and precisely £^om
the extent to which he was disregarding international law. His guilt i
enormous,
In general, there are three excuses offered by the defendants
having allowed this calamity to take place. The first is that the reports
, ^ rpnlv to this that
are either exaggerated or false. It is enough to say m
the gruesome uniformity vftiich is to be found in every document relating to
the physical condition of Russian prisoners of war, no matter what t e
source or authorship of the document, eiteludes the possibility of either
falsehood or exaggeration.
The second defense is that the condition of these prisoners of war
Was partly sell-inflicted. The argument goes this way: the Germans SU3>-
rounded large groups of Russian soldiers during the early months of the
campaign. If these Russians had been reasonable, they would have surrend
ered as quickly as they found that they were cut off. Instead, they obstin
ately perservered in resisting until their food, water and ammunition sup
plies were exhausted. Therefore, they were in a somewhat debilitated con
dition when they first came into German hands. It follows that the Germans
are not to bo blamed if they died by the millions later on.
Apart from the fact that this argument is inconsistent with the con
tention that the reports are either fictitious or inaccurate, it is ridic
ulous' to say that because a man is hungry and ragged, when he becomes your
prisoner of war you have the right to allow him to die of malnutrition or
to freeze to death. V/e know of no requirement in international law or aiy-
where else that soldiers, upon surrendering, must bring along their own
housing and cooking facilities.
The third and last defense consists of a kind of shell game in "vnhich
the pea represents responsibility for •fche care and treatment of prisoners
of war. Leeb, the Amy Group Comnander, wants to say that this lay entirely
with his Amy Comioanders and -with the commander of the Rear Area of the
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Army Groups The kmy commanders want to say that the responsibility fell
on the commandant of prisoners of war^ although Hoth testified candidly
that his Oberquartieimeister dealt with prisoner of war affairs and that
he, as coimnander of an Arny, was responsible for taking care of the prison
ers of war in his area, the documents show conclusively that, within the
operational area, the /vrmy Groups and /umiies exercised complete control
over prisoner of war affairs.
D. Deportation and Enslavement
Paragraphs 6U to 68 of Count Three of the indictment charge the defen
dants with war crimes and crimes against humanity against the populations
of occupied countries, including the deportation of the inhabitants to
forced la.bor in the Reich, the forced labor of the inhabitants on field
fortifications and for mine clear^ce, the plunder of private and public
property, and wanton destruction and devastation. We shall leave most of
these matters to presentation in our briefs, and will deal here only with
the responsibility of the defendants for the deportation of millions of
civilians to forced labor in Germany.
TiVtien Germany commenced to reach the bottom of her manpower barrel,
the scheme was initiated to make wholesale transfers of workers from
occupied territory to the Reich for use in the armaments and munitions
industries. This overall plan was implemented in various ways. At first,
drives were put on to encourage foreign workers to volunteer for labor
service in Germany. The response to this was so feeble that machinery was
set in motion to substitute force for persuasion. In the Yfest, the "Sauckel
Action" v/as instituted in the spring of 19U2. The result of this was, as
1
Tribunal III stated in the Kfupp case}
Wholesale manhunts were conducted and able-bodied men were
shipped to Gerioany as "convicts" Tdthout having been charged
or convicted of any offense. Jiany were confined in penal
camps for three months during which time they were required
to work for industrial plants. If their conduct met with
approval they were graduated to the status of so—called
"free" labor. This was a misnomer as they were detained
under compulsion.
1. tfeited States v. Alfried Krupp, et al», (Case No. 10) Tr, p. 90
..67-.
The record shows that the defendant Sperrle, who was ConiiTiander of
all German Air Force Units in the West and also served as Commander-ih-
Ghief West during Rundstedt's absence, cooperated with the agencies of
Sauckel's labor Mobilization program. Sauckel himself told Milch at a
meeting of the Central Planning Board that Sperrle had been most obliging
in this respect. On another occasion, Sperrle sent a basic order vifliich
directed that Gorman agencies in Northern France and Belgium were not to
recruit laborers on their own initiative, as this practice interfered with
the Sauckel Action#
A different procedure was used for impressing and deporting civilian
workers in the East. There the agency which was primarily charged with
the task of obtaining the labor which Genaany needed was the Economic Staff
East, which operated as part of Goering*s Four Tear Plan. The defendants
attempt to disclaim all responsibility for what was done by this organi
zation# But this disclaimer is contrary to the evidence of what actually
happened. An Economic Inspector was with each Army Group staff. Attached
to the staff of each army was an Economic Leader, Economic offices which
belong to the organization were also to be found with the Arngr Group Rear
Area, the Security Divisions and the Feldkommandanturent, In other words,-
every agency of the German Ground Forces from the Amy Group Area to the
front line troops was riddled with representatives of Economic Staff East.^
As an example of the part which the Army played in the implementing
and execution of the slave labor prj^graa,^ a-briaf marrative of the evi
dence relating to the defendant Reinhardt will be illuminating. On the
witness stand, he testified that the first time he or the staff of his 3rd
Panzer Army were involetad. ^ -y-Lg drafting of workers to be shipped to
Germany, was in July 19ii3. The downright untruth of this statement cannot
be demonstrated better than by the contents of two documents, both issued
in November The first is an order which was signed by Reinhardt
himself in which he announced thati^
The Fuehrer has charged Gauleiter Sauckel with the direction
of the entire labor allocation program reaching into the
zone of operations# An intelligent cooperation of the military
1. NOpr 3^39, Rebuttal Exh, 39,- Rebuttal Bk II, p.l?#
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agencies with the departments of the labor allocation adminis
tration must make It possible to mobilize the work-capacity of
the entire able-bodied population. If success cannot be achieved
in any other way, coercive measures must now be applied to
recruit the required labor for allocation in the Reich»
The report of a Secret Field Police group to the 3rd Panzer iirmy three
weeks later stated the following:^
Jefim Charitonow,,,»with his three Juvenile children, made
his v/ay to the partisans, although the children objected;
he was arrested on his way# <
He was shot on October 22# The three children were sent to
Germany to work#
An order issued by the headquarters of one of Reinhardt*s subordinate
2Corps on 2 June 19U3 contains the following:
The drafted labor forces will attempt to dodge the labor
allocation with every means at their disposal#,•#ii.ll
men and women are to be instructed that they will be shot
at ar^ attempt to flee,,,••The labor camps with the
divisions must be surrounded by barbed wire and remain
under constant supervision#
In July 19U3, Reinhardt drafted and published a proclamation to the
3
inhabitants of the territory occupied by his troops, which provided:
All persons of the age group 192^ have to serve their com-^
pulsory labor term in the Reich Territory, with the exception
of those who are employed as voluntary helpers, with indigenous
units, or with the indigenous police service#
^ rc ^ ^ ^
moever tries to evade his service obligation will be severely
punished. The seme also applies to perso^ who by harbori^
amrone liable to service or in any way help hxm (her) i-n
attempts to evade the service obligations or strengthen
in his intent to evade his duty# Moreover, in place of™
person liable for service who has not appeared, his next of
kin may be drafted for labor allocation in the Reich, regard
less of the personal circumstances#
On July 23rd, the minutes of a meeting held at the headquarters of
the 3rd Panzer /ixmy noted that one reason for the difficulty in appre
hending inhabitants for labor commitment was the large quota which had
1#
2.
NOW 686, Eros. Exh, 719, Bk IX-G, p# 26#
, NOW 2100, Eros, Exh# hlli Bk VII-Ai p# 152#
3. NOW 23UO, Pros# Exh# U8U, Bk VXI-A, p# 191#
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the Reich". One cure which was proposed for attemptecl evasion of service
in Germany was that members of the fanilies of persons who had escaped were
to be apprehended "regardless of personal situation" and substituted for
1the escapees»
On 26 Ju3y the 3rd Panzer knay niade a report to center,
concerning the recruitment of Eastern worlffirs. The introductory sentence
reads: "The population rejects labor allocation in the Reich", One of
the measures suggested to overcome this resistance was the following:^
Persons apprehended by force after attempts to evade this
draft at first will be sent to penal camps which must be
run along strict lines.
It was al^o mentioned that the age group 1926 had to be drafted as well
as the members of the 1923 class*
This is an appropriate place to mention the testimony of one of
Reinhardt>3 witnesses, who said that Reinhardt demonstrated his objection
to these orders. He was asked how he demonstrated it. jhe answer was:-
by assuring the population that only members of the I925 age group were
affected, and that the rest of the populo.tion need not be apprehensive
about this program. Apparently the witness had reference to the proclsjn-
atlon which was mentioned a moment ago. The value of Reinhardt's reassur
ance as a soothing syrup must have been somewhat diminished when he added,
within less than a month, still another age group to the list. The docu
ments show that the quota of a thousand workers a week, which had been
assigned to the 3rd Panzer iirmy, was being met by the middle of August,^
Reinhardtts iirmy Group Headquartoirs continued to issue orders nro-
vidlng for the shipment of workers to Germany, One such order, involving
approximately 100,000 persons,, is dated Ifevember 19i|iia^ Reinhardt*s
principal defense on this issue ahnost takes us into the realm of meta
physics, He and his witnesses adinit that a ccmpulsory labor service
program was instituted by the Arriiy, but they say that no force was used, ^
1. NOKW 2^73^ Pros. Exh, l+S?, Bk VII-A, p, 222
2. NOKVT 2k^ks Pros. jSxh, 1489, Bk VII-A• p, 226,
3. Tr, p, 383ii« . .
it, mm 2570, Pros. ,Exh, lt92, Bk VII-A, p* .235*-
5, , WOKW 2931j Pros. Exh, 1279, Bk VII-Supp. p, 26, -
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How such a program could be compulsory v/ithout the use of force is indeed
difficult to understand. Perhaps, the misunderstanding lies in the meaning
of the word force# We associate shootings, severe punishments and baibed
wire enclosures with force, Apparentlly Reinhardt does not,
E, Murder and Ill-treatmenb of Civilian
Populations: the Einsatzgruppen
Repression and ill-treatment of the civilian populations of the occu
pied countries was not limited to deportation and enslavement of their
persons and plunder and destruction of their property. Grave as these
crimes vrere, there were others which were even more savage. Thousands
upon thousands of civilians were illegally spirited away and imprisoned
or murdered, pursuant to notorious "Nacht und Nebel'*'decree formulated
b^Yvarlimont fuid lehmann, . A stupid and brutal policy for the suppression of
resirstanC^oy the indiscriminate slaughter of hostages characterized the
German occupation almost everywhere. But the darkest blot on the record
of the German Arny and of these defendants is their participationJ;:njtJie
slaughter of millions of Jews, gypsies, and political officials in the
Eastern occupied territories. And wo will conclude our discussion of the
evidence today vdth a brief analysis of the responsibility of these defen
dants for the millions of murders committed by the Einsatzgruppen of the
Security Police and SD — a program of murder which was described by Mili
tary Tribunal II as "beyond the experience of normal man and the range of
manmade phenomena",^
All the defendants have emphatically denied any knowledge of the exbe3>»
mination mission of these units and of criminal acts perpetrated by the SD,
If they learned at all that communists, Jews and other so-called "undesir
ables" were being killed, then the rumors vjhich came to their ears concerned
only events which had happened somewhere far in the rear, in territories
under civil administration. And they were never able to put their fingers
on the sources of these rumors, or to evaluate their credibility. They
never dreamed that the Einsatzgruppen of the SD were in anyway concerned
with such "excesses". In each and every case, it was the indigenous pop.*?
1, United States v, Ohlendorf, ©t al,, (Case No# 9)* Tr, p, 66U8,
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ulation which spontaneously killed coramunists and Jews#
Bubj at the same time that this strange phenomena was transpiring, all
these defendants, witnesses and affiants who professed complete ignorance
of the ''illegal" activities of the SD units, displayed detailed and accur
ate knowledge of what they called the "legal" tasks of the Einsatzgruppen,
such as security tasks, appraising the political situation, and partici
pating in anti-partisan combat. That these security tasks embraced the
extermination of those races and classes which might endanger or onHy
inconvenience the future of Hitler's thousand-year Reich, escaped their
attention somehow.
The laws and customs of war provide for military authority over the
territory ox the hostile state,^ Territories are considered occupied
according to those laws when It is actually placed under the authority
of the hostilo army. The occupation extends only to the territory where
2 ' • X
such authority has been established and can be esrercised. The milib^.ry
3
authority is obligated to ensure public order and safety and to respect
family honor and rights and the lives of persons. Tribunal V in the
"Hostage" case has given full recognition to this principlet
The commanding general of occupied territory having
executive authority as well as military ccmmand, will not
be hoard to say that a unit talcing unlawful orders from
someone other than himself, v/as responsible for the crime^
o.nd that he is thereby absolved from responsibility. It is
here claimed, for example, that certain SS units under the
direct command of Heinrich Himmlcr committed certain of the
atrocities herein charged without the knowledge, cor^enb or
approval of these defendants. But this cannot be a defense
for the comiiianding general of occupied territory. The duly
and respor^ibility for maintaining peace and order, and the
prevention of crime rests upon the commanding general. He
cannot ignore obvious facts and plead ignorance as a defense.
As holders of executive power and coimaianders in their areas, the
defendants were the highest authorities. Thus they bear full responsibilily
for all criminal acts against civilians which were carried out by aryone
for the time v/hen they were in coimnand of these areas. The testiiiiony of
the witness Ohlendorf is noteworthy, Chlendorf was condemned to death
1, Section 3, Annex to Hague Convention of l6 October l^OTji Art* U2-^6,
2, Ibid, Art; 1^2,
3, Section 3^ Annex to Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, Art, u3.
Ibid, Art, ils* ' •
5, United States v, VaOhelra Ust, et al,, (Case No, ?) Tr, pp. 10U55-56,
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in this very building, but the Tribunal ^mich found him guilty of mass-
murder paid high praise to his truthfulness.^ Yiihen asked if the liquid
ation of Jews, corrjiuiinists and other "undesirables" was carried out with
the authorization of the limy authorities, ChlendGrf statedi
I believe that the very fact that the l,Vehrmacht itself issued
requests and directives for these executions and gave their
support for the carrying out of these executions are
suffioient proof for their consent without having to add
one other word. Such demands were repeatedly made with
respect to mentally insane, but these could be rejected by luo
because the instructions issued to me made it possible for me
to reject the requests of the Wehrmacht. However, with respect
to the demands of liquidating Jev^s in Simfercpel at the begin
ning of Seotember l^iil, I had to comply with ihe instruction
because I had no argument to counter it. In order to carry
out this liquidation which transcended our possibilities, the
Amy afforded to us all "necessities in factual and practical
respects. For the rest, the Army knew about liquidation of
Jews earlier than I did myself, since at the beginning of
the Russian commitment I, myself, had been eliminated from
Work with the /irmy for at least four weeks and the Anny
commanded the Binsatzkommandos directly while I vras left
in Roumania. According to limy instructions, these Binsatz
kommandos reported directly to the lirmy about the liquidation
of Jews such as took place, for instance, in Czernowitz. I
myself didn't even get a copy of these reports.
In view of the authority exercised and responsibilities borne by
these defendants, it is not, strictly speaking, necessary to establish
that "they had actual knowledge of the Einsatzgruppen. As Tribunal V held
in the "Hostage" case,^ "An yjntiy comander T/ill not....ordinarily be per
mitted to deny knowledge of happenings within the area of his coiimand
while he is"present therein". But the contention that the activities of
these gangs of murderers who were fed and housed by the limy and would
have been helpless without the iirmy support, were unknown to the iomy
commanders, and that these killings of millions took place without thoir
knowledge, is a palpable grotesque fabrication. As the defendant leeb
himself testlfiedj^ "Every military cor.i2TiandQr at the front is highly
interested ihat in his battle area, and in the rear of his battle area,
peace and quiet and law and order prevails among the civilian popuj^tion".
The defense witness Haider was "firmly convinced" that the slaughter of
Jews "certainly provoked indignation among parts of the Russian civilian
1. United States v. Otto Ohlendorf et al,, (Case No. 9) Tr, p, 6787.
2. United States v. List, et ai,, (Case No* 7), tr. p. loWl.'
3. Tr, p. 2361^,
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population"^ and agreed that "it would not be unreasonable for a Coinmander-
in-Chief to take the position that the activities of the Einsatzgruppen
in executing substantial parts of the population was a threat to his
security and to his operations". The defendant von Roques testified
that it vras his duty as Comniander of the Army Group Rear Area to safe
guard the lines of communication and supply, and to insure military
2
security in his area. That is why security divisions were stationed
in the rear area to patrol the roads and railways, and why the Feld-
koramandanturas and Ortskommandanturas were established in the towns and
villages. As the record abundantly shows, the area behind the front line
was not a desert where one could wander to and fro unchallenged, but rather
a veritable maze of rear headquarters, conimand posts, prisoner of war
stockades, airfields, ammunition and gasoline dumps and supply depots,
hospitals, motor pools, and security and communication units that made it
possible for tho front line troops to engage in conibat. That is why the
array carried on counter-intelligence activities in the occupied area, and
why intelligence reports were regularly submitted to the headquarters of
these defendants telling them what was going on behind the lines. The
Secret Field Police, the security divisioi^, and many other units were in
constant and close touch with the civilian population. Men, women, and
children can not be wrenched from their hcmes and snatched off the streets
by the hundreds of thousands and led away to slaughter and burial in a
common grave, without the knowledge of their relatives, friends, and
neighbors, or without lamentation, outcries, and bitter protests. The
bare suggestion that the Einsatzgruppen. flitted through Russia, murdering
Jews and other "undesirables" by the millions, but secretly and uribelcnownst
%
to the Army, is utterly preposterous.the desperate sparring of men
who have no recourse but to say what is not true.
This evidence is compelling as to all the defendants and it is almost
a work of supererogation to press the question further. But the defendants
did not have to depend for their information on what they could so plainly
see and hear going on about them. Let us briefly examine scsne of the
1, Haldeh, Tr, p, 2107,
2, Tr, pp, l?li24Ut,
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clocumentica^y evidence with respect to three of the defendants —— leeb^.-
Roques, and IToehler#-
1.. Von Leeb
The order concerning the employment of the Einsatzgruppen in the
operational area was distributed to Leeb's headquarters on 28 April 19Ul»
On 8 June came the Coimnissar Order directing the execution of civilian
comraissars and coimiiissars attached to the troops#^ This order expressly .
stated that coimnissars arrested in the Rear Area of" the Army Group "on
account of doubtful behavior" were to be handed ever to the Einsatzgruppe
or Einsatakoiranandos of the Security Police and SD» On 2h July the first
of two criminal orders on segregation of prisoners of wab and civilians in
.camps and the execution of "politically untenable and suspicious elements:
commissars and agitators" found among them ms issued to Leeb's headquartr
ers#^ It also provided that "suspicious civilians" in the iirray Group Rear
/jrea would be turned over to the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos of
the Security Police and SD* The order of 7 October 19^1, received by Leeb«
headquarters, altered the segregation procedure by providing that it was
henceforth to be done in the Rear iirea of the Army Group by Bonderkonmiandoi
of the Security Police and SD rather than by army unitsi I quote from its'
In agreement with the commanding officers of the Rear Ariiy
Group iirea (district commanders for prisoners of war)^ the
operations of the Sonderkommandos have to be regulated in
such a way that the segregation is effected as unobtrusively
as possible and that the liquidations are carried out Tdthout
dolav and at such a distance from transient camps and^villages
as to insure their not becoming loiown to the other prisoners
of war and to the population#
One need not be a Field Marshal to understand these orders. Any
wemi-llterato person .fto received a^r one of ttiese three orders would very
well know that the Einsatzgruppen were murder squads. I^eb's headquarters
received all of them.-- Leeb does not deny this. He merely says that he
does not recall reading them or doing anything about them.. Far from being
leeb's salvation, it is his condemnation.
1* WM 1706, Rros. Exh,. $7,"Bk III, p#
NOKff 2U23, Pros# Exh». 2U]4, Bk VI-AB,
fi#- NO-3l422j, Pros# Exh». 367, Bk VI-©!, p« 21b»i
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A tabulation of the number of executions by Einsatzgruppe attached
to Leeb^s Array Group, shows that, from the beginning of the Russian cam
paign to 1^ October 1914-1^ 135,567^^rsons a few
thousand of whamv/were Je'wa# The vast majority .of these murders took place
in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which were within the operational area
of iirmy Group North during part or all of lihe aforementioned period* Es
tonia, where l,l58 were killed, was always within the operational area
of Array Group North, as shown by the operational maps in evidence. The
Reichs Commissariat was established in Estonia on 5 December 19Ul, hut
leeb conceded that the Comi'iiander of idie Rear- Area of Army Group North still
had military functions and powers after that date*
Leeb tried to shift substantially all of the murders by Einsatzgruppe
A into the area of the Reichs Commissariat Ostland, He testified that
Einsatzgruppe A had no connection to the VTehrmachti that its crimes were
never reported to the Wehrmacht and that they occurred hundreds of kilo
meters away from the front.
All of this is clearly refuted by the report of Stahlecker, Commander
of Einsatzgruppe A, as'well as numerous other documents. The murderous
activities began during the first days of the campaign in active and close
collaboration v;ith Leeb's immediate subordinates. Stahlecker saidi"
Einsatzgruppe 'A' after preparing their vehicles for action
proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23
June 19Ulj the second day of the campaign in the East,
AriiQ'' Group North consisting of the l6th and l8th Armies and
Panzer Group U had left the day before. Our task was to
hurriedly establish personal contact with the commanders
of the Armies and with the cah^.iander of the am^ of the
rear area (Army Group Rear Area). It must be stressed from
the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was
generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer
Group i; under Gen. Hoeppnef, it was very close, almost
cordial. Misunderstandings "v^ich cropped up with some
authorities in the first days, were cleared up mainly
through personal discussions,,,,At the start of the Eastern
Campaign it became obvious with regard to the Security
Police that its special work had to be done not only in
the rear areas, as was provided for in the original agreements,
with the High Command of the Army, but also in the combat areas,
1, L-180, Pros, Exh, 956, Bk IX-P, p# U8#
2, Tr, pp, 25lU-l5»
3, Pros, Ex, 956, L-I80, Doc, Bk 9 P, page 20,
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The Stahlecker report describes further the horrible massacre at
Kowno which was captured by the l6th Army a few days a|ter the campaign
1
opened
During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to 26»6 the
Lithouanian partisans did avfay with more than 1500 Jews,,
set fire to several Synagogues or destroyed them by other
means and burned down a Jev/ish dTfelling district consist^
ing of about 60 houses^ During the following nights about
2^300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other
parts of"lithouanian similar actions followed the example
of Ko^vno^ though smaller and also including the Communists
who had been left behind.
Those self«c leans ing actions went smoothly because the Amgr
authorities v;ho had been informed showed understanding for
this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only
the first days after the occupation would offer the opport
unity for carrying out pogroms.
Thus, army authorities under Leeb were informed of the planned massacre
before it even took place. Leeb's own headquarters were located in Kowno
from 1 to 10 July, He admits he heard of Icillings in Kowno while his head«*
quarters were still in East Prussia, but denies ar^r killings while his
2headquarters were in Kovmo. It appears, however, that the murder and
persecution of Jeww continued during the time Leeb was in Kowno and there
after. The report above speaks of pogroms during the nights following
326 June. Another Einsatz report dated 11 July 19I4I stated:'
In Kownd a total of 7^800 Jews have been liquidated up to
now, partly through pogroms, partly through shootings by
lithuanian Kommandos. All corpses have been removed.
Further mass shootings are no longer possiblei I summoned,
therefore, a Jevfish coimnittee and explained that up to now v/e
had no reason to interfere with the internal arrangements
betvreen the Lithuajjians and the Jews....
Prisons now are being combed through once more, Jews —
if special reasons prevail - are being arrested and shot. -
This will involve executions of a minor nature of 50 to
100 persons only. To prevent Jews from returning to
Kowno, an agreement was made with the Higher SS and Police
Leader to the effect that the ORPO draw a cordon around
Kowno not allowing any Jews to enter the town. If necessary,
Jews will be fired upon. All Wehrmacht agencies were in
formed about the directives.
I4 Pros* Exh* 956, Ir-180, Doc. Bk. 9 P>..p« 30.-
2. Tr^ pi 2513. •
3. Pros. Ex4 922, NO-293i4., Doc. Bk. 9M, pp. 101-102,
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Leeb was asked what he did in connection with this wanton slaughter
of over 7^500 Jews in an area controlled by his troops. - His reply was
that he told the l6th Array to prevent any further excesses.^ Assuming the
^ruth of this highly doubtful statement^ he caused no investigation to be
made, he had no one brought to justice, he took no effective steps to
avoid its repetition., His troops controlled the city, his subordinates
knew of and supported the atrocities. They continued while Leeb v/as in
Kowno. He did nothing. .
Precisely parallel atrocities took place in Riga shortly follov/ing
its capture by the l8th Army about 1 July 19Ul. An Einsatz report dated
7 July 19^1 proves that units of Einsatzgruppe A had entered the city and
instigated a pogrom. "All syngagues have been destroyed| UOO Jovjs have
2already been liquidated." It also pointed out that, as a result of the
alleged shooting of a German soldier by a Jew, "100 Jews were shot on
the very same spot by a Kommando of the Security Police and SD." But this
3
was only the beginning. A report of 16 July 19iil stated:'
At Riga, the Einsatakcmmando 2 assorted the entire material^
searched all offices, arrested tho leading Communists as
far as they could be found and, headed by SS-^turmbannfuehrer
Barth, conducted in an exemplary manner all actions started
against the Jevfs# 600 communists and 2,000 Jews are under
arrest at present. . I4OO Jews ivere killed during pogroms in
Riga and, since the arrival of EK 22,300 by the Latvian
auxiliary police and partly by our own men. The prisons
will be emptied completely diiring the next days. Outside
of Riga additional 1,600 Jews vrare liquidated by the EK
2 T.yithin Latvia. .
A report of 6 July I9UI establishes the murder of 526 persons by
units of Einsatzgruppe A in Garsden, Itrottingen, and Polangen. "During
the three large-scale actions mainly Jews were liquidated. Among tho
number of executed, however, there were also Bolshevist officials and
snipers, some of which had, for this reason, been handed over by the
Wehrmacht to the Security Police.^
Up to 16 July 19itl, a unit of^ Einsatzgruppe Ahad killed l,l50 Jews
in Duenaburg. "The arrested Jewish men arc shot without ceremony and
1. Tr. .p. 238U. . •
2. Eros. Exh. .958, NO-2935, Doc, Bk. 9P, p. 56.
3. Pros. Exh. 92U, NO.2938, Doc, Bk, 9 0, p, 3,
ii. Pros, Ex, 921, NO-29)40, Doc, Bk, 9 N, p, 96,
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interred in already prepared graves,Between 22 and 25 July 19Ul^
229 persons designated as Communist Jews and Jewish women^ Russians,
Lithuanian Communist functionaries, and a Politruk were murdered by a
2
unit of Einsatzgruppe A in Pagiviai, Kedainie, and MarianpolS;,
The mass murders thus far discussed occurred in Lithuania, Latvia,
and Esthonia between the beginning of the attack on Russia -nd 25 Ju!ly
19Ul» Throughout the whole of this period, the places in which such mass
acres occurred were under Leeb^s jurisdiction in the operational area of
Army Group North — which extended from the border of the Reich to his
front line. The Reichs Commissariat Ostland was first established on 25
3July 19i4-l and extended to the Duena River# Most of idle cities where the
massactes took place were at the time located in the Rear Aj:*ea of Army
Group North, while Kowno was, for part of the time (1 to 10 July) leeb's
own headquarters,
Yftien Dorpat and Reval in Esthonia were captured by troops of Army
Group North, "a Kommando of the Security Police was always with the first
army units''#^ The same report showed that up to 25 October 19U1# UTU
Jews and 681+ Communists had been executed in Esthonia, A report of Ein
satzgruppe A covering its activities up to the end of 19U1 stated that
6
"Today there are no longer ary Jews in Esthonia,"
During the time when these atrocities occurred, Esthonia was part of
7
the operational area of Army Group North, The cities of Eeval, Dorpat,
Narva, and Pirnau in Esthonia were in the Rear Area of Army Group North
8during the month of October 19U1# Martin Sandberger, a defendant in
Case No, 9, was chief of Sonderkoraraando la of Einsatzgruppe A, His con
viction and sentence of death in that case was based upon murders (most of
which are summarized above) committed during 19iil when he was at all times
active within the operational area under Leob's jurisdiction. Of parti-
9
cuXar interest is the following finding by Tribunal II in that case:
1, Pros, Eidi, 92U, NO-2938,. Doc, Bk 9 P« 3»
2, Pros, Exh, 959, NO-28U9, Doc. Bk 9 P, P- 59.
3, Leeb, Tr. p* 2^16$ also oporational maps of 7 and 20 July iyUl,
Exhm IM8O, N0ICifWl50, and Exh. IU8I, NOKW-3151.
U. Pros, Exh. 956, I.-I80, Doc, Bk. 9 P# P» 20,
5. Ibid, p, US,
6. Pros, Exh, 957, 2273-PS, Doc, BK, 9 .P> P* 5l«
7. Leeb Tr. p, 25X5. 1. nt rvo
8. Leeb Tr, p, 252lj see also the oporational map. Pros. lh93, NOIW-316
9. United States v, Ohlcndorf et al (Case No. 9) P» 6819,
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On September 10, 19U1, Sandberger promulgated a general
order for the internment of Jews which resulted in the
internment of k$0 Jews in a concentration camp in Pleskau,^.
The Jews were later executed.
Pleskau was teeb's headquarters prior to September 19lil until he
resigned in January 19U2. How much greater was the pcwer and responsibility
of Field Marshal Leeb and his commanders of the l6th and l8th ibrmies.
Panzer Grpup k, and the Rear Area of Anjy Group North than that of the
insignificant SS Colonel Sandberger? One might as well liken the "blazing
glory of the noon day sun to the tiny flicker of the fire-fly","
The murderous collaboration between leeb's troops and Einsatzgruppe
k continued.
The localities mentioned in a series of four reports, covering the
period from the middle of October to the end of November and proving the
murder of approximately 1,300 persons with the active participation of
Ifieb's subordinates, were In the very front area of Army Group North as
shown by the operational maps in evidence.^ it should also be pointed
out that Sonderkommanda la under Sandberger or Einsatzgruppe Aestablished
an office in Pleskau as early as 10 July X9kl^ It was still there on l6
January 19i;2 and during substantially all of that period Leeb had his head
quarters in Pleskau,^
A report of the 28lst Security Division of the Rear Area of Army
Group North dated 1 August 19ij.l states that "200 Communists and Jews from
the district of Rositten were shot in the morning hours by the Latvian SelC-
kDefense." The slaughter of Jews at Rositten was repeated four days later;
5the same document reports:
In the early morning of 5 August several hundred Jews were
shot by the Latvian Self-Defense. In order to forestall
any misinterpretation the Division has established by
inquiry of the C,G» that this special operation was ordered
and carried out by order of the SD.
1. Prow. Exh. Ilr90, N0Bfir-3l60, Ex. lU9^,'NOKW-3165, Exh. lU96, N0iasr-3l66,
2. Pros, Exh. 906, NO-3I4OI, Doc. Bk, 9 N^ p. Ul»
3. Pros. Exh. 901, NO-3Uo5, Doc, Bk, 9 N, p., 17,
U, Pros. Exh, 962, KOKW-21^0, Doc, Bk^ 9 P, p,-65,
5, Idem.
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The Divisional Ccmmander presented the facts of the case
to the officers on the Divisional Staff at an officers
conference and added the grave reminder that every soldier
had to abstain from criticism of^ and comments on these
matters »
The Commander of the 28lst Secmrity Division knew the slau^ter of
Jews was official army policy, and pub these incidents in his report to
higher headquarters, but the Field Marshal who commanded him testified he
didn*t know \ The city of Rosittenj Latvia was in the Rear Area of Army
Group North before and after this mass murder, and units of the 281st
Security Division were stationed there during that time«^
2 ^ Von Roques
Another example of blissful ignorance is the defendant Roques« From
2
his headquarters was issued an order which reads:
5») Executive measures against certain parts of the popul
ation (in particular against Jews) are expressly reserved
to the forces of the Senior SS and Police Leader, especi-
al3y in those districts v/hich have alfeady been pacified#
On the 29th and 30th September 19Ul about 31;,000 Jews were slaughtered
by units of Einsatzgruppe C in Kiew^ which was occupied by troops which
were subordinate to Roques* His chief of staff visited the unit which
registered these killings. The next day the unprecedented massacre occurred
Nevertheless, Roques denies that he ever heard of the killing of the Jews
in Kiew from his chief of staff or anyone else#
During the month of August 19Ul^ i;U,000 Jews were killed by units of
the Higher S3 and Police Leader,^ This dignitary was the representative
of the Security Police and the SD in Roques* area#^ He usually had his
headquarters in the same locality as the defendant and frequently dined
with him and his officers#'^ But, strangely enough, Roques did not leam
what the tasks of this man were. Twenty-three thousand of those ijii-,000
victims of Roques* dinner—partner, were killed in Kamieniec Podolsk during
three days#^ On 2 September Roques* chief of staff had a conference at
1. Leeb Tr, p, 2517-18.
2. • Pros, E5di, 1575> N0Klflf-259i;, Tr, p# 5h79#-
3. Pros, Exh. 951, NOIO/f-2129, Doc, Bk, 9 P, p# !•
ii., Pros^ Exh,.95U, NOKW-2129, Tr, p. 5U91#
5,,^ Pros,, Exh,. 9U3, NO-31U6, Doc, Bk# 9-0, p, 66,
6,. Tr, p, 529U,
7,. Tr. p. 5U71.
8. Pros, Exh#..9i;0, NO-315I4, Doc, Bk 9 0-, page 52#
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the headquarters of Army Group South in which the figures "concerning the
1
settlsment of the Jewish question in Kamieniec Podolsk" were discussedi
The Higher SS and Police Leader^ however, was in no way as reluctant
and secretive as Roques wants us to believe® A report of his, a copy
of which v/as forwarded to the defendant, states unequivocally that 1,658
2
Jews had beon killed in a mopping-up operation® Does it need to bo said
that by a happy coincidence Roques never learned about the contents of
this report? It should further not be assumed that the Higher SS and
Police Leader having executed UU,000 in August, did not proceed to murder
in September® A report of 19 September 19Ul reveals that 1,303 Jews,
among them 875 Jewesses over twelve years old were executed by units
subordinated to him# The place of the iiir"-3sacre, Berditschew, wqs at that
3
time the headquarters of Roques#
On the 19 September 19^1 the Jewish district of Shitomir was evacu-
ated and all Jeww of the place, 31b^j in number,- were transported by 32
trucks, which had been placed at the disposal of" the Einsatzgruppen by
the Feldkommandantur and the City Administration of Shitomir, outside the
city limits® The 3alU5 Jews were registered and executed® Fifty to sixty
pounds of underwear, clothing etc® were transferred to the Natioml Social
ist People*3 Waifare Organisation. This execution was carried out on the
basis of decisions vftiich vjere made at a joint conference between the re
presentative of the Einsatzkoimnando and the Feldkommandantur. There it
k
was decided "to liquidate the Jews of Shitomir complete3y and radically"®
Shitomir at that time was located in the Rear Area of Army Group South,
thus the Feldkommandant by whom those killings were approved was subord-
5inate to Roquos#'
Roquos* own witness admitted having watched an incident at the veiy
outbreak of tho wsr, when the Jew, of Dobromil were herded together in the
market square by the SD, and the I'krainian militia® This happened in the
Pros, Exh® 938, NOM/-155U, Doc® Bk® 9 0, p® 50®
Pros® Ex® 81, NOIW/-1165, Doc® Bk® 3A, p® 116-7®
Pros® Ex, 1U85, WOKi.'-3155»
Pros® Ex® 9h^, NO-31UO, Doc. Bk® 9 0, pages 79-
Roaues Tr® o® 5Ii87« Pros® Ex® II482, NOKlif 3152,
, l fe,
U5 . -60®
q p |. , x, J W , Pros# Ex® II489, NOKW-^
3159#
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Immediato vicinity of the defendantts headquarters. Officers of Roques*
staff were present and observed this incident*. The witness was under
the impressicn that the defendant suffered a mental shock as a result of
2 •
this experience* One of the incidental effects must have been amnesia.
as Roques maintains thqt he never learned about the task of the SD^
3* Woehler
"When approximately 90,000 Jaws -wer^.r>f "Plirsatz -
•3
gruppe Da Yfoehlor was chief of staff of the 11th Army. In his capacity
as chief of staff, he wielded no executive power, but had cominand author
ity over the menibers of the staff. Those officers collaborated closely
with Einsatzgruppe D»
V Ohlondorf testified, as a witness for Woehler,. that the orders for
the commitment of Einsatagruppe Dand its siibordinate units were issued
by the defendant* WoehlGr<s immediate subordinates, the intelligence and
counter-intelliS^"-'^ ® officers, had complete knowledge of the extermination
task of the Einsatzgruppen and worked with them every day*
Woehler asked Ohlondorf to turn over to the Army all watches obtained
from "actions" against Jgwh^ and when Ohlondorf complied with this request
and reported that a further shipment of watches from the "drive against
Jews" could be made available to the 11th Army if they were needed, Woehler
answered with an emphatic "yes",^
Woehler^s defense is that he was of the opinion that those watches
were obtained from Jews who had been "resettled"* There is an answer in
the record to the question of what such "rGsettlement"meant* There are
many documents in evidence where a word in connection with the treatment
of Jaws is crossed out and replaced by the word, resettlement. One of
6
these reports bears clear proof what the original word was* It readsj
The - (the original word is crossed out and replaced by the hand
written word resettlement) of the Jews, nuirbering about
2 ^00, was carried out on 1,2, and 3 December. SubsequentGxecutions are to be expected since part of the Jewish popul-
ation fled, is hiding and has to be apprehended first.
1, Tr. p# ByUj-7
2 Tr p, 8927#
3 pros. Ex* 91U, NO—3359* Doc» Bk, 9 Nj p* 70,
kl Pros,. EX, 968, NOKW-631, Doc, Bk, 8, p. 96,
9, Pros, Ex, 1606, NOKW-3238, Tr. p, 60li6-4i7.
6* Pros, Ex, 891^ NOKW-1628, Doc, Bk, 9 M, p. 68,
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Woehler receivod reports -jniiich stated that the indigenous population
was liberated "from the communists and Jews who had remained behind"
that Sonderkommando 11a, a sub—unit of Einsatzgmippe D, was "straigntening
out the Jewish question" in Nikolajew^, and that the "Crimea was free of
Jews"»^
On the 3 July 19hl the defendant issued an order that an Einsatakommandi
of the Security Police should proceed to Belzy,^ This Einsatzkommando
promptly killed the Jewish Council of Eldeers and h$ other Jews there.. It
fijrther directed the Roumanian Police to shoot an unidentified nuiribor of
Jews.?
On 9 July an Einsatzkommando of Einsatzgruppe D reported through the
11th Army:^
On the basis of available wanted lists and newly compiled
records, on the 7th of this month the arrest of Jews and
Coinmunists began. On the 8th of this month a large-scale
operation was conducted in the course of which it was
possible to catch all the leading Jewish elements with only
a few exceptions. On the following day about 100 Jewish
Communists were shot by the Kommando. Counting also the
executions of Jews carried out by the Rumanian armed forces
and Police, a total of over ^00 Jews were shot in the course
of the 8th and 9th of this month. A detachment was sent to
Hodin to screen that place.
Woehler*s counter intelligence officer received and copied the report.
Woehler himself ordered the Einsatzkommando to remain in Czernovritz.
3,105 Jews and 3h communists were liquidated in this place by the Einsatz-
7
kommando#
On the h August, 19Ul, Einsatzgruppe D reported to the 11th Array that
68 Jews and a number of Jewish hostages had been shot by Sonderkommando 11a
o
In Kishinjew# Woohlor read this report. He previously had sent the Son
derkommando to Kishinjew with the order to seize Jews and politically
Pros# Ex# 1607, NOK.T-
Pros, Ex# 1609, NOKfT-
undesirable elements*^ On the same day Woehler received a report that
2
in Kodyma 9? Jews had been executed by a unit of Einsatzgruppe D« These
Jews had been shot with the approval of the defendant Sahnuth by an exe
cution squad consisting of 12 members of Einsatakommando 10 a and of 2h
soldiers, who bolonged to units subordinated to Salmuth.^ Salmuth in turn
was subordinated to the 11th Arny»
On lU November I9I4.I, the Ortskommandantur of Simferopol reported to
the Rear Area of the 11th Army that "the 10,000 Jews remaining are being
executed by the CD"o^ At that tixie Woehleris headquarters was l5 to 20
miles away from Sir.iferopol.^ The Cberquartiermeister of the nth Army,
Wcehler's direct subordinate, was located in the city itself. Neverthe
less, Woehler wants the Tribunal to believe that he never heard of the
kining of Jews in the area of the nth Army. Einsatzgruppe Dreported
on the 12 December 19Ul from Sinferopol;
Shootings® '
2,910 more Jews and 19 Communist officials were shot al^or
summary proceedings. Thus the sum total of executions has
risen to
The final answer to this contention of all the defendants was given
7
by a young medical officer, the witness Dr, Fruechte:
For every officer and for every enlisted man it was, at
that tiaiie, a matter of course that every Jew was shot®
This subnect was discussed with almost everjbody "with
whom one talked for more than three minxes. At leastitTas brought up, and I have not talked to ^ who
said: 'That is completely now to me. I don t Im
anything about it. What are you telling me'. It was
a completed fact for everybody.
1. Rebuttal Exh. 113, NOKSV-3557.
2! Pros. EX. 1395, NOKW-3237, Tr. p. 5982,3. Pros. Ex. 7U1, NOKW-586, Doc. Bk. 9 I, P. 10.
Pros, Ex.. 883, NOKW-1573, Doc. Bk, 9 M, p. 52.
5I Tr. p. 605U.^ ... .6* Sos^.*E^°^893, WO-2828, Doc. Bk. 9M, P. 70.'
7# Tr# p®. 91l5j 9117•
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CONCLUSION
This concludes our discussion of the evidence under the charges
of the indictment. Ifeny serious accusations have not "been dealt with'
the "Nacht und Nebel" decree formulated by Warlimonb and Lehmann, the
orders and practices for the execution of hostages which played such a
large part in the '^ Hostage" case,^ the plunder of property and the
wanton destruction and devastation of tovms and villeges, the forced
labor of women and children on trenches and fortifications under the
most rigorous conditions of vforkj and the conduct of Leeb and Kuechler
outside Leningrad. He have endeavored to select naterial for discussion
today with respect to which defenses have been raised which are common
to several or all of the defendants, in the belief that such a selection
would be most helpful to an appraisal of the case as a whole.
In conclusion, we would like to deal briefly with the question of
mitigation. In some instances, the defendants were acting in accordance
with orders or decrees issued by superior military authorities, and
Control Council Law No. 10, like the London Charter, provides that such
a circumstance "may be considered in mitigation".^ . In the cases of
Keitel and Jodl, the International Military Tribunal was unable to find
any circumstances which could be Considered in mitigation. Are the
principal defendants in this case in any better situation?
In his Opening Statement on behalf of the defendant Leeb, his
counsel declared that these defendants were "unprepared for the means
with which Hitler fought", that they "were not equal to or able to cope
with his demoniac personality", and that "it was too late when they
recognized the true nature of this man". Assuming the truth of those
observations, do they indeed constitute a true measure of the defendant's
Should these oircumstanoes be allowed to mitigatg .KgifiSBalhimy,
for this most terrible of all wars, for the overrunning of harmless
1. United States v. Wilhelm List, at al., (Cagg 7)
2. Para, 4 (b) of Article II
3. Opening Statement of Dr. Latemser, p. 5
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neutral nel^hors,-and- for the comtloss deaths of coiranandos, comnissars,
Jev/s, and oti-ior victir.s Vvhose misoreble fate the ovidonce in this case-—
has unfolded?
Again, the defense tells us repeatedly that these men were cr.ught
up in an impossible situation which allowed of no solution v/hatsocverj
as Dr, Laternsor nut it, '*it has been their fr-te to arrive at situations
and in particular to be brouglit into situations by the leadership for
which, oven today, the prosecution cannot suggest an escape that might
have boon open at tho timo."^ And tho defendant Lecb hiraself, after
testifyin; concerning his conduct with respect to the Commissar drder,
2
doclared:
I have hc.d ample time and opportunity to phink about this ordor
and about what we did at that time under the pressure of responsi
bility and here I must admit I don't knov; cvon today any better
v;ay«....I ror.lly don't know how Vire could do it differently today.
Troro these inon -- these Fioldmarslials and generals — really so onnoshod
that it was impossible for them to avoid crime?
he should observe, at tlio outset, that it is not tho duty of r.
prosecutor in drawing an indictment, or of a Tribunal incbtermining
guilt or innocence, to tell the defendant how ho should have ordered
his life. The man who has no problems — whoso rr.tcrial wants are
satisfied, v/hose domestic life is contented, and idiose personality is
in harmony with tho ciroumstr.ncos of his environment — such a man is
rarely found in the defendant's dock. Crimes are most often committed
when men find themselves' in difficult situations, subject to pressures,
temptations and fears, The oangs of hunger, the lust for wealth ai^
oorrfort, a dark and violent upbringing, tho frustration of emotional
needs, pressures and fears — all these things help us to understand
the criminal and why he became such. It is not part of the function of
tho prosecution at the bar or the judge on tho bench to explain to the
defendant what turn ho should have taken at each fork in the roc.d in
order to avoid tho tonptatlon or the fear "^Thioh ultimately led him into
crime. Prima.rily, these are problems for tho psychiatrist and the
1. Opening Statement of Dr. la.ternsor, p. 21
2. Tr. p. 2353
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penolosist. But the '^" do plc.y a rr.rt — p.nd rightly — vjithin the limits
of tliG discretion vested in the judge — when he comes to impose sentdme,
piid for that reason v/e deou it appropriate to make a fevv-- observations on
this score. itVhat is the measure of the guilt of those defendo.nts?
In approc.ching this problem, we suggest that thero are at least
three nuostions the answers to v/hich vnil help to guide us toward a
wise solution. How strong wore tho pressures on the defendants, and
what paths were .open to thorn? Vfnat is their present attitude in retro
spect toward their own conduct? How will the decision as to the measure
of their Shilt affect other ;-ersons la related slteations, and fhr.t effect
will it have on organized hurr.n society?
On the first point, ™ Bust bear in „iad that we are not dealing
here with the ordinary soidior who, in the oonpany of his ooinr.des and
sobjoct to all the pressure of group behaviour and the violent atmosphere
of combat, is ordered by his comjaanding officer to o omit a oriminr.l act.
T!ie.t is the ordinary situation to meet which the doctrine of mitigation
by virtue of superior orders was devised. Suoh a soldier is not aoous-
tomed to responsibility or the resolution of difficult problems, is
trr.ined to instantaneous and instinctive obedience, has no time for
reflection, and is in imminent and mortal peril if he disobeys, or oven
hesitates, These defondcnts wore not in that situation, "uhoro their
crimes were instigated by orders from above, tho orders oamo in writing
from a distant place, were recoivod by the dofondanbs at a headnuartcrs
of rdiich thoy were in command, and there v/as full opportunity for roflec -
tion on the course of action to be pursued.
To SCO what paths were open to those ncn, l©t us once again look
at tho Conmissar ordor as an example. At bottom, leob^s defense comes
doivn to his contention that he could not openly oppose the order becci'se,
had ho done so, his opposition "would have bcccmo knoivn inmedirtoly to
the hi chest quarters and.....in any caso, hitler would have found out
about tliis strong opposition".^ Thoroforo, since ho disapproved tho
order, his only avonuo of oscap© was what he cr.llod "tacit sabotage".
1. Tr. p. 2351
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A momonffi reVlection will show thcxt this is uttor nonsense and a post-
fnbricatod excuse. It is perfectly obvious thnt the Commisser Order had to
bo o'pposod openly or not at all. ^The order had been announced at a mooting
... - 'jj 3 ' • ' u ^ ^ ^ " -I •- • ..-•_i'-_.C-
with Hitler at which all of the principal ComnKandors-in-Chicf wore present.
A number of pcoplo participatod in drafting it, and copies were dispatched
to ali tho principal headquarters on the Eastern front. Hitler's intention
to issue such an order, and subsequently the existence of tho ordor itself,
immediately bocame kncfvai throughout tho higher circles of the Army. Himmlcr's
SS also had functions to perform in connection v^ith the Commissar Order, and
its existence was knovm throughout tho SS and SD on the Eastern front. Lot
us assumo that Loeb and the'other defendants, vihcn they passed the Order
dov/n, actually did what they now say they did. Let us assume that they
personally passed down firm instructions that the ordor was not to be complied
with, and the information that tho Coinmandor-in-Chief of the Army oJid all
tho Field Commanders-in.Chiof were opposed to the ordor and had diroctod
that it not bo observed. What would have happened?
Tho answer is pcrfootly oloar — the order would not have boon carried _
out by tho troops of tho Gorman Army, and their failure to carry it out would
have soon booomo known to Hitlor and tho OKFf. Hardly a week oould have
passed before tho Einsatzgruppon and tho sorooning teams of tho SD would haie
obsorwod that tho Army was not carrying out tho order, and report their fail
ure to Himmlor. Hardly more time could have elapsed before ordinary military
Channels ef inforH^ticn - intolUscnce reports, visits to Berlin by officers
j. ^-p I'lnnQon officers from OIIH and OIOT ——
on leave from tho front, reports of liaison oiiioors
TT..L1 DTCi'i that the order vms not
would hOvVo mdo it apparent to Hitler an
tho documents establishedbeir^ oboyod. Xndcod, in the happier d..y
r. j_ __^nivn ond was in fact executed,
that the Commissar Order was in fact passe
counsel for tho generals took tho position that the Comissar Order was not
passed down, orwas passed down with directions to disobey it - and. exactly
r^rttorn of conduct constitutedin line with what we arc now saying — th-t this p .
, "The Commanders-in-Chief of the
open opposition to tho Commissar Order*
I e +V(T s order on to -their troops at all.Army Group or Army either did not pass this
I, •.u.r 4-n Qvrde it. They did so xn full
or thoy ordorod, on their own authority, to ovaae
^ thov might be heavily punished for open discs onsciousncss of tho danger thi-.t tnoy 6^
obadionoe in war to an order of the supromo commr.nder."
Closing Statement of Dr. Utornsor before the mT, p. 65
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Ylhen wg say that tho Goramissar Order had to be opposed openly or
not at all, v/o of course refer to the general pattern of conduct of the
Conimanders-in"<Jhlof as a group. It probably v/ould have been possible for
one or tvvo Individual commanders to secretly disobey the order by merely
throwing it in the vrasto basket and not passing it down to their subor
dinates. That is what Dr. la-t^rnsor'tolls us that Fieldmarshal Rommel
did with the Commando Order. That is what the defendant Leeb told us he
did with respect to the Fiftieth Corps and the Army Group Rear Area,
and that is what the defendant Kuechlor told us he could not do with
respect to his subordinate units. This device of secret disobedience might
have furnished a personal solution for a few of the Commanding Generals,
but if adopted by all it would, of course, speedily have attracted
attention and ammoxmted to tho equivalent of open disobedience.
In short, the idea of "tacit sabotage" of a widely-known, highly
controversial order such as tho Conmiissar Order is 3.S apocryphal as the
phoenix or the unicom. That is precisely why the defendants were led
into such a maze of self-contradictions and absurdities in their desperate
efforts to make the unicorn come to life. That is why we hear in one
breath that most commissars coimiiittod suicide or rippsd off their
insignia in fear of what they kn^w would be their fate, and in the
other that tho order was not carried out. That is why we are told one
minute that the reports of executions were concocted to deceive higher
headquarters, and the next minute that the reports prove so small a number
of executions that disobedience to the order must have been the rule.
Secret disobedience, accordingly, was more than a
few and "tacit sabotage" is a myth, "IVhcn ©ther defendants
received the Commissar Order they could either have swallowed it or
refused to obey it, Tho proof clearly establishes that they swallowed
it, and the defense evidence proves only that • when they swallowed it,
it may have tasted bad. And he who swallows an order such as the
CommtBSax Order must be prepai'od to take the consequences. It is all very
well to talk about the necessity for obedience to orders and the main
tenance of discipline, but when we are concerned with an order such
as the Commissar Ordur which, instead of promoting discipline, undermines it,
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an order vAiich the defendants all claim constituted an egregious example of
military stupidity, an oi^er which directs the commission of murder on a
vast scale, and an order ^hich the defendants well knew was a shame and a
blot on the Jirmy to vhich they had devoted their"^yes^ there is but one
conclusion. No man could ^rve his Army or his country by obeying such
an order# -
Xfc is academic to debate the qxiestion iiAiether, if all the
in-chief had openly declared their unwillingness obey the CoBimissar Or
der, the result vDuld have been a modification of the order, or their dis
missal and replacement by other generals, it is academic and speculative
to debate whether they would have had a better chance of dianging Hitler<s
mind by a less ostentatious manifestation of disagreement which might bet
ter have en&bled him to save his face, m any event, there is absolutely
no basis to assume that a dignified expression of unwillingness to comply
vdth an order which was not only criminal but stupid would have had no ef
fect on Hitler. Whatever may have been Hitleris other faults, he was not
totally without intelligence, and, at least until the latter stages of the
war, there is no indication that he felt he could get along without gener
als to lead his troops. Throughout the war. Hitler never turned to anyone
but the generals to lead his troops, except in two or three instances out
of hundreds. why was the defendant Leeb himself called back from retire
ment, m 1938 and again in 1939 although, according to his own testimony,
he was in disfavor with Hitler and Himmler because of his religious con
victions and other manifestations of opposition to Nazism? As the defense
witness Haider testified. Hitler was unable and unwilling to replace even
the generals whom he mistrusted "because at least at the beginning, he
did not think that he could forego the expert knowledge of these generals",
and this attitude on Hitleris part continued"approximately until the end
of 19A3- and the beginning of I942", many months after the issuance of the
orders involved in this case.
The defendants have told us that they would have been reluctant to
resigu iu protest against such orders as the Commissar Order, because that
would have involved an abdication of their responsibility towards their
_ __ ^
Himmler,Sepp Dietrich and one
o 1A leaders were given high military commands#2# Haider, Tr. p, 2026,
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would merely have led to their replacenent by others who v/ould have been
more willijig to conform to Hitleris desires. Yet, when Hitler began to
interfere seriously in tactical matters at the time Haider mentions, the
generals resigned in droves, Leeb and Hitler came to a parting of the
ways because of a disagreement on tactical matters and three years later
the same thing occurred between Hitler and Kuechler. If it was abdica
tion of responsibility towards the troops, and an invitation for re
placement by weaker men, to come to an open break with Hitler over the
Coimaissar Order, or the Barbarossa jurisdiction order, or any of the other
criminal orders, it was equally an abdication to come to a break because
of tactical disagreements. And i^ether or not it was theoretically possi-
¥
ble to resign one*s command voluntarily, it v/as perfectly easy, as Kuech
ler put it, to "make demands in such a v/ay that a break must occur".^
The records of the German Field Marshals and generals are full of just
such instances where a resignation was accepted, or where Hitler on his
own initiativa relieved a oammander, because of tactical disagreements.
It is perfectly plain, in short, that the German generals thought that
tactical matters were sufficiently vital to warrant forcing matters mth
Hitler to the breaking point, but did not so regard the ordmilnal orders
and policies which are the subject of this proceeding. It is not for the
prosecution to say whether any particular defendant should or should not
iTS-ve resigned, or openly declare his refusal to obey an order such as
the Commissar Order, or adopted some other solution of the problem.
The choice between these several alternatives would, for any individual,
"be governed by his temperament and his estimate of the overall situation
at the time. But that there were solutions to this problem other than
th3tt which the defendants adopted is perfectly plain.,
To conclude on this point, we must not forget that one can find no
basis mitigation in a superior order, if there is no evidence that
the defendants* will was affected and coerced by the order. If the de-^
fendants* will coincided with that of the superior who issues the cHmi-
nal order, or if, having full opportunity for reflection, and choice, he
jifikes no serious effort to avoid the conimission of crime, there is no
bas is for mit Igation
^Tr. p. 2982.
And when we find the defendants - such as Hoth - actively furthering the
•objectives of these criminal orders by stirring up the troops to hatred
of the Jews, we must conclude that these are circumstances not in mitigation
but in aggravation.
To turn to the second question, have the defendants demonstrated here
an attitude in retrospect toward their own conduct which invites judicial
clemency to find circumstances in mitigation? There are many hew roofs in
jj^rnberg: can we see reconstruction tinder way in this court room? Regret-
fully^ such is not visible from where we sit. The defendants have not hesi
tated to resort to inconsistent and implausible excuses, and have denied
loiowledge of things which must have truly assailed all their seven senses.
The sleej:^, unobservant or insensitive men. The defen
dant Leeb, for example, is a cultured and highly intelligent person, fully
alive to the moral factors in a situation; to sec this we need look no
further than his correspondence with Brnuchitisch concerning the offensive
jji the west and the violation of the neutrality of the Low Countries, He
distrusted Hitler, and was disgusted with Himmler's policies and —to say
the lo^®^ suspicious of his organization. He knew of the atrocities
Qf the SS lu Poland, Ho heard Hitler in March of 19^4-1 outline a barbaric
and terri^^® program of warfare in Russia, He saw the Commissar Order and
the J^fsdiction order emerge. He knew that units of Himmler's
qS were coming with his own troops for special political tasks. He says
that he compl * d about these matters to his commander-in-chief and to his
conm^ , and his staff must have been aware of this. His head
quarter® ' 'Orders the screening of prisoners and the liquidation -
the ^desirable elements". His headquarters received reports
the '^dssars. Thousands upon thousands of Jews and others
were operational area. It is quite incredible that such
- Leeb under all tv,
a meh "-nese circumstances would have known nothing aboutjnurder ^rocitieg^ believe -tliat his denial of such
these
•Xedg'3 fur ' s the basis for mitigation or leniency.
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Finally, we cannot fix our gaze exclusively on the defendants' dock.
The acts of the defendants profoundly affected millions of other men, and
the decision in this case is not to be rendered in a vacuum. The judicial
process is a social process. . There are others to be considered beside the
defendants, and I do not refer to the millions who lie buried because of
the events related by the record of this case. They, too, have their claim
to make here, but their strongest claim is that these things should not
be repeated.
The doctrine of mitigation by virtue of superior orders is a doctrine
the purpose of which is to protect those whose opportunity for reflection,
choice, and the exercise of responsibili'^ yj- non-existent or limited.
In modem military organization, the chain of command runs up from the
ordinary soldier through his officers military coramander-in-chief and
then to the Supreme Command, which may be lodged in a Chief of State, a
President, a Cabinet, or other civili®'^ agencies. Within this structure,
everyone is subject to orders, even if ^ Fieldmarshal. Obviously,
the doctrine of mitigation by superior orders is not intended to give a
blanket protection to anyone, no matter how highly placed, merely because
he is in the military hierarchy and r esponsible to someone else. Other
wise, the entire doctrine of individual responsibility v/ould be destroyed,
and the Chief of State himself would be the only one who could no^ claim
mitigation.
That is why, may it please the Tribunal, the prosecution firmly be
lieves that it would be unwise, and unfair to the millions of troops who
served "under these defendants, to gi"""® weight to the doctrine of superior
orders as applied to such defendants as Leeb, Kuechler, Both and others
whose positions were at or near the top of the military hierarchy. Count
less criminal outrages occurred in the sphere of command of these defendants.
Somewhere, there is unmitigated responsibility for thesis atrocities. Ig
it to be borne by the troops? Is it to borne primarily by the hundreds
of subordinates who played a minor role in this pattern of crime? We think
it is clear that that is not where the deepest responsibility lies. Men
in the mass, particularly when organized and disciplined in armies, must
be expected to yield to prestige, authority, the power of example, and
the threc.t of instp.nt punishment. The stondo.rds of conduct of
soldiers nrc bound to bo powerfully influenced by the examples set by
their commanders. That is why we said, in our opening str.tenont that
"the only way in v/hich the behavior of the German troops in the recent
war can bo made comprohonsiblo as the behavior of human beings is by a
full exposure of the criminal doctrines and orders which were pressed
upon thom from above by those defendants and others", could the
Gciman Army look to, other than Loeb and the senior Fieldir&rshals, to
safeguard its standards of conduct and prevent their disintegration;
If a decision is to bo rendered here vdiich may perhaps help to prevent
the repotition of such events, it is importrjit above all olso that
rosponsibility bo fixed whore it truly belongs. Mitigation should bo
reserved for those upon whom superior orders aro pressed down, and who
lack the moans to influonco general standards of behavior. It is not,
wo submit, available to the commander "vdio participates in bringing the
criminal prossuro to bear, and whose rosponsibility it is to ensure the
preservation of honorable military traditions.
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